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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HUBERT WOLFE, SHIRLEY 
WOLFE, his wife, ELLIOTT 
WOLFE, KAYLA WOLFE and 
MERRILL STRONG, copartners, 
doing business under the firm name 
and style of WOLFE'S DEPART-
MENT STORE and WOLFE'S 
DEPARTMENT STORE, a co-
partnership, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
- vs.-
SARAH WHITE and JAMES L. 
WHITE, her husband, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
7431 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPOND·ENTS 
PREFACE 
The insuperable barrier to appellants' (defend-
ants') success in this case is the lease. If they could 
only avoid the terms and provisions of their own lease 
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which they drew, there might be some relevancy to 
their brief. Their determined efforts to avoid discussing 
the actual terms of the lease and their studious and 
repeated misquoting of its terms, of course, indicate 
that they, themselves, are aware of the fact that the 
lease itself defeats them and is the sound foundation 
upon which the decision of this Court rests. 
. 
.A!ppellants' brief on this appeal consists of some 
69 pages. 63 pages are nothing more nor less than a 
rep·etition of their brief in this Court when the case 
was here, No. 7153, on the first appeal. The citations 
they mainly rely upon in the p~resent -brief were used 
in the former brief and were discuss·ed by us in our 
former brief. Their inapplicability was pointed out by 
us. This Court's opinion in Wolfe vs. White, 197 Pac. 
(2) 125, rejected the position and argument presented 
by the defendant~ at that time, and defendants' 
present brief is merely a reargument of their former 
untenable position. In their present brief they have 
not even bothered to change some of the headings, and 
while others of the headings are in rearranged word!3, 
the substance is the same. We do not intend to reargue 
the case, but will later in this brief, discuss defendants' 
brief and its lack of merit under the facts as they are 
relevant in view of the decision of this Court. First 
we shall attempt to present to the Court the facts de-
veloped at the trial. They su1pport the verdict of the 
jury and establish the plaintiffs' right to recover from 
the defendants. We shall also discuss the action of the 
trial court in striking from the verdict items of damages 
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awarded by the jury and point out vvhy we think the 
court erred in so doing. We adopt this order of pro-
cedure because we think the ap:pellants' brief does not 
present the relevant issues nor give this court a true 
or an adequate understanding of the ca.se as it novv 
stands. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. THE PREMISES AND THE LEASE. 
The premises in question here are located at 248-
256 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and are 
approximately 78' 3" north and south on State Street 
and 123' 6" in depth running east and west. The dimen-
sions are important in understanding the magnitude 
of the work which was done to fix the roof. They are 
located on the west side of State Street, Exhibit "A", 
the lease. In 192~ Miles E. Miller, an architect who 
testified for the defendants, remodeled these prerriises 
to accommodate the J. C. Penney ·Company, His object 
was to convert the entire ground floor into one large 
area by removing partitions and strengthening the roof, 
(T. 628). Before that remodelling there were five 
stores with partitions, (T. 696). These partitions were 
removed with the four separating ;partitions leaving 
the outer north and south walls. The four partitions 
ran east and west so that there had been six lateral 
supports for the roof, ( T. 698). In the remodeling, two 
girders running east and west were put in supported 
by 10 x 10 posts. He reused the existing joists -running 
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north and south which had formerly supported the roof 
and in order· to do so it was necessary to splice every 
joist. These joists had to be spliced in order to reach 
the ne'v girders so that the joists which had formerly 
been supported by the six lateral supports running 
east and west were on the remodeling only supported 
by the outer walls and the two girders, and they had 
to span a 26 foot s:pace in order to reach from the wall 
to the girder, from girder to girder and from girder to 
wall. Every one of them had to be spliced, (T. 698, 699). 
Then above the girders were the rafters which ran 
north and south and were held up by struts and braces 
forming what is called a trussed rafter. These rafters 
ran the same direction as the joists and also had to be 
spliced. Then came the sheathing. upon which was 
placed the material constituting the roof surface. The 
roof was a flat roof, (T. 700, 702). The distance be-
tween the joists and the rafters ranged from 3¥2 feet 
at the lower end to about 5 feet at the upper. This was 
the To of structure at the time of the lease from the de-
fendants to the plaintiffs, Exhibit "A". 
The lease is dated February 19, 1945, is set out in 
full in the opinion of this Court, Wolfe vs. White, 197 
Pac. (2) 125, and provides that the lessors (defendants) 
lease to the lessees (plaintiffs) the premises for a term 
commencing March 7, 1945, and ending the 31st day of 
May, 1956. The premises are then described, then fol· 
lows the provision for the p·ayment of rental at the rate 
of $550.00 a month from March 7, 1945, to June 6, 1946, 
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a period of 15 months; $-±80.00 for the period r.omnlenc-
ing June 7, 1946, and ending June 30, 19±6, and $600.00 
for the _9 years and 11 Inonths period comn1encing July 
1, 1946, and ending ~Iay 31, 1956. The rental \Yns fixed 
in this method for the reason that the lease recites in 
;paragraph 5 that the premises are presently occupied 
by the Ste\Yart Novelty Company under a lease ex-
piring June 6, 1946, and the lease between the parties 
hereto \Yas made subject to that lease, and it was pro-
vided that if Stewart Novelty Company ·paid its rent, 
then the lessees (plaintiffs here) 'vere- under no obli-
gation and had no right of possession under the lease 
until June 7, 1946. There is no dispute that the Stewart· 
Novelty Company paid its rent and under the lease 
involved here plaintiffs had no obligations and no rights 
until June 7, 1946, more than 15 months after the date 
of the lease which, as stated, was February 19, 1945. 
The lease provided, paragraph 3, that the lessees at 
their own expense would make permanent improvements 
including the installation of a first-class front at a co~t 
of not less than $10,000.00, which permanent improve-
ments were to ·be commenced- ''on or before June 7, 
1946, or as soon thereafter as Government restrictions 
w·ill permit. Rental shall be paid during the time said 
improvements are being made'' ; that all such perma-
nent improvements shall become a part of the realty 
and become the property of the lessors at the end of 
the lease. Paragraph 3 further provided: 
"After said permanent -improvements are 
made, it is agreed that further structural changes 
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shall not be made to said premises by the Lessees 
without first obtaining the written consent of the 
Lessors, which consent Lessors covenant will not 
unreasonably he withheld.'' 
Paragraph 6 of the lease is as follows: 
"In consideration of the rental herein fixed, 
the L·essees agree to and do hereby accept said 
premises in the condition and state of repair they 
are now in, and for the last ten years of this 
lease, all improvements, upkeep and repairs, of 
every kind and nature whatsoever, regardless of 
the extent thereof and whether the same be or-
dinary or extraordinary, and regardless of how 
the same may be necessitated, except as herein-
after stated, including ,repair and upkeep of the 
heating :plant and replacement of all glass, in-
cluding plate glass broken, are to be made at 
the expense of the Lessees. If plate glass insur-
ance is carried, it shall be carried at the expense 
of the Lessees. '' 
Paragraph 7 provides· -for the delivery of the demised 
premises at the end of the lease and specifies that 
''Lessees agree to occupy said premises in a lawful 
manner.'' Paragra;ph 8 is as follows: 
''For the entire term of this lease the Lessors 
shall have the obligation to keep the roof of the 
leased premises in good condition and repair; 
to pay general taxes and lighting assessments 
levied against said p~roperty, all fire insurance 
premiums and premiums on any other insurance 
the owner elects to carry.'' 
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7 
Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 contain provi-
sions 'vith which we are not now concerned. Paragraph 
16 is the lessors' covenant that the lessees '' shall and 
may in accordance herewith pe·acefully and quietly have, 
hold and enjoy said demised premises during the term 
hereof.'' Paragraph 17 provides for attorneys' fees for 
the successful party in case of court action involving 
the lease. Paragraph 18 provides that in the event of 
fire lessors agree to repair and ~estore the premises 
with reasonable dispatch. if the premises are rendered 
untenable by fire. Paragraph 19 is an option to renew, 
and paragraph 20 specifies that lessors' remedies ;pro-
vided for in the lease are not exclusive of other reme-
dies. 
2. REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND 
DEFENDANTS' REFUSAL TO ACT. 
Lessees (plaintiffs and respondents here), in ac-
cordance with the requirements of paragraph 3 that 
they should spend at least $10,000.00 on permanent im-
provements including a first-class store front, the work 
to be commenced on or before June 7, 1946, or as soon 
·'thereafter as Government restrictions will permit, in 
March of 1945, one month after the signing of the lease, 
employed. A. B. Paulson, a licensed architect, to make 
plans for the remodeling of the store front. These plans 
were in course of preparation during the next six months 
and were completed about Christmas of 1945, (T. 290, 
291). 
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In October of 1945 the defendant James White had 
written Mr. Wolfe, one of the plaintiffs, that the roof 
had been fixed and was in ''excellent shape." (Ex. H.) 
Neither :party knew anything about the roof at the time 
the lease was entered into and never made a:ri examina-
tion until this present trouble came up, (T. 859). The:re 
was no reason, therefore, for Mr. Paulson to do any-
thing other than he was employed to do which v1as to 
design the store· front and to make a fixture layout for . 
the counters and the interior so that the process of 
merchandising could be most effectively carried out, (T·. 
290, 292). The ·nxtures· were designed to accommodate 
the existing posts, ( T. 582). ·These original plans of 
Mr. Paulson's had nothing to do with the roof as it 
existed. It had been pronounced to be in. excellent shape 
by the owner. · 
Defendants make considerable ''to do'' because. 
·eventually the· roof was fixed by making a clear span 
by the lise of steel girders fro in the north to the· south 
wall and eliminating the ~posts, and suggest, with 
nothing to support their suggestion, that ·Mr. Paulson 
and Mr. Wolfe were determined from the beginning to 
construct a new roof with a clear span at the expens~-~ 
of the defendants. Nothing is further from the facts. 
We have already shown that Mr. Paulson was en-
gaged entirely on the plans for remodeling the store 
front and arranging the fixtures, and a part of the fix-
ture_ arrangement was to accommodate them to the 
existing posts. Mr. Paulson was anxious to get rid of 
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radiators that were in the store as they interfered with 
the efficiency of his layout plan, (T. 292), and felt that 
if he could insulate the attic, he could remove the radia-
tors from the store. l\Ir. Wolfe told him to go ahead 
and secure bids for insulating the attic which would 
cut about in half the amount of heat required. In order 
to determine the method and manner of insulation, Mr. 
Paulson and his employees went u:p into the attic for 
the purpose of making an inspection with reference to 
insulating, and at that time they noticed that excessive 
deflection existed in ·all roof members and decided that 
it would not be safe to add the insulation of approxi-
mately 4 pounds per square foot to the roof. When he 
ran into this excessive deflection, he wrote Mr. Wolfe a 
letter on January 15, 1946, Exhibit 7, (T. 292, 294), 
calling his attention to the unsafe condition of the roof, 
particularly emphasizing that the trussed rafters and 
the girders were undersized and unsafe, that the roof 
had only one drain .and that if the drain should pJug 
up, the roof would carry additional water backed up 
from a storm. He also advised Mr. Wolfe, that he had 
gone through the building with the building inspector 
and immediate attention should be given the roof, and 
that in addition to the other things mentioned the sky-
lights weakened the roof and should be done away with. 
Mr. Paulson on the same day, Exhibit 6, called the 
attention of the building inspector to the condition of 
the roof and advised him that the building was owned 
by Mr. James L. White. On January 22, 19·46, the build-
ing inspector, Exhibit 2, wrote Mr. James L. White 
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calling his attention to the fact that the roof was unsafe 
and should be corrected, and that ''in case of a heavy 
snow it will be necessary to close the building for public 
use." Mr. White admitted that he received this letter, 
( T. 87 4), and that he didn't do anything with reference 
to Mr. Tipton until he met him in Aprjl. 
Mr. Paulson noticed 3 to 4 inches deflection, and 
~ince his_ job had nothing to do with fixing the roof, he 
called the attention of Mr. Wolfe and the building in-
S}Jector to the condition, and the building inspector 
asked him to write the letter, Exhibit 6, which he did, 
(T. 295, 296). 
According to Mr. White after he re-ceived the letter 
from the building inspector, Exhibit 7, all his business 
was conducted by correspondence, which appears as 
Exhibits "I" to "M" inclusive, and Exhibit 1, which 
is a letter from Young & Hansen dated July 8, 1946, a 
letter from Mr. White to Mr. Wolfe dated the same 
day. This correspondence includes letters addressed 
to Mr. White by Mr. Wolfe and Mr. White's answers 
and shows that on March 12 Mr. Wolfe wrote Mr. 
White enclosing a letter from Mr. Paulson, Exhibit 7, 
and asking him to correct the condition, and that plans 
for the work should be made in advance. He advised 
Mr. White that he was sparing no expense to make 
the location the show place of the West and that Mr. 
White should correct the condition· of the roof; that 
time was running short and something should be done. 
On March 13, Exhibit "J", Mr. White re·p,lied that the 
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'vork required by nir. Paulson's letter 'vas not a root' 
repair, and that l\Ir. ''rolfe should call upon him ·''only 
for roof repairs from no'Y to the end of the tern1 of 
the lease.'' On .... \.pril 1 l\Ir. ''T olfe ansv,Tered this letter 
and suggested that a mutual friend present the lease to 
three disinterested la'v offices and that he 'vas 'Yillinq; 
to accept their findings as final if Mr. White would do 
the same. He also advised ~Ir. White at that time, April 
· 1, 1946, that the roof is unsafe, that a permit to remodel 
the above described premises was refused on that ac-
count, that he thereupon made demand upon the lessors 
to put the roof of the leased premises in . a safe and 
proper condition, and .that. unless prompt action was 
taken, he, Mr. Wolfe, would cause the proper work to 
be done to make the roof safe and in good condition. 
With reference to the :suggestion that the lease be sub-
mitted to three law firms, Mr. White testified that that 
suggestion wasn't feasible, and when asked whether he 
felt that he haq drawn a lease so obscure that three la"\V,. 
firms couldn't agree on it or else it was so clear that 
three law firms would find ~gainst him, he said that 
whatever went through his mind he didn't think. that 
was a p~racticab~e solution, (T. 877, 878), and that re-
gardless of his knowledge of what the building authori-
ties had required he did not :fix the roof. He . frankly 
admitted that he didn't intend to, (T. 867). On April 2 
Mr. White replied, Exh1bit ''L ", stating to 1\tfr. Wolfe 
that he had again carefully read the lease and that there 
was only one sentence in the lease providing for work 
to be done by him, quoting paragraph 8, and asking Mr. 
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12 
Wolfe to give him the name of his attorney. This letter 
shows that Mr. White at that time had before him the 
specific language of paragraph 8 which he quoted. Mr. 
Wolfe answered the letter on April 3, Exhibit "M", 
telling Mr. White if he wanted to know the exact work 
necessary to be done to consult with Mr. Paulson ''or 
by engaging some other competent building engineer or 
arc;hitect ", and advising Mr. White that his la,vyers 
were Rich, Rich & Strong, :particularly Mr. Benjamin 
L. Rich. 
These requirements of the building authorities 
which were the subject matter of the foregoing corres-
pondence are set out in full in the complaint and are 
here as Exhibits '' B '' and '' C ''. They are a letter from 
the Superintendent of the Bureau of Mechanical In-
spection to Mr. Paulson dated March 21, 1946, advising 
him that with reference to his application of March 20, 
1946, for a permit to remodel the front of the prop·erty, 
that the roof was unsafe because the rafters were over 
stressed and sagging and that the girder·s were under-
sized ·and bowed; that he had notified the owner, Mr. 
James L. White, of this condition on January 22, and 
that ·obviously this condition must be rectified, ''and, 
therefore; your application is being held in abeyance 
until assurance is given that the roof condition will be 
taken care of,'' and a letter from Mr. Tipton, the Su-
perintendent of the Bureau of Mechanical Inspection, 
on April 29, 1946, Exhibit "C", to Mr. Wolfe ·advising 
him that he had called the attention of Mr. Paulson 
and Mr. White to the condition of the roof, and ''these 
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13 
factors make it mandatory up·on me to refuse to allow 
continued occupancy of this structure beyond this sum-
mer season for fear of future heavy snow loading 
'vhich might cause total beam ·and trus·s failure and 
consequent collapse of the roof structure.'' Mr. White':-; 
attention was called to this letter of April 29 some time 
after April 29, (T. 875), and "rhile he contends that 
from April 5 to . June 7 he heard nothing more fron1 
Mr. Wolfe or Mr. Paulson, (T. 875), he himself never 
communicated with them in the meantime and he didn't 
do anything; he didn't know what they were going to 
do; he relied upon them to go ahead, (T. 876). He didn't 
ask Mr. P·aulson for a statement of what was necessary 
to be done, ( T. 877). He didn't propose any eoun ter-
plan to Mr. Wolfe. He just suggested that Mr. Wolfe 
go ahead and fix the roof ''as economically as possible, 
and we would have to decide who was going to ~pay for 
it.'' (T. 878.) Mr. Wolfe did go ahead as ·economically 
as possible, but Mr. White objects to paying, ·although 
he concedes that he made no counter-proposals and did 
~othing between April 5 and June 7, the date Mr. Wolfe 
was supposed to go into possession. 
Mr. W·olfe, being unable to get Mr. White to act, 
did proceed. On June 14, 1946, ·Mr. Paulson wrote him, 
Exhibit "E ", advising him t·hat it was necessary to 
submit a roof plan to Mr. Tipton, and that because the 
entire roof with the exception of the eolumns was un-
safe, that to OJlen the area that is not safe and make it 
safe would cost more than to remove the present roof 
and put on a good roof. He called his attention to the 
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fact that if they could eliminate the posts, it would 
cost more than to use the posts. The roof as finally 
constructed did eliminate the posts, but the defendants 
are not charged with that extra cost. Exhibit "D-1" 
shows the actual cost of the roof to be $14,408.97 fron1 
which is deducted $2,224.94, the extra costs of construct-
ing the roof by eliminating the posts. While defendants, 
as above stated, have made considerable ''to do" abo_ut 
the clear sp~an construction, they know and the record 
is clear, that they were not charged for clear span con-
str~ction. Mr. Wolfe bears t·hat expense fron1 his own 
pocket. No attempt was made to make defendants pay 
for it. The extra cost of the clear span construction 
was completely deducted from the cost of the roof, and 
the jury allowed nothing for the extra cost of the clear 
span construction. Mr. Wolfe did exactly as Mr. White 
' 
expected him to do. He followed the recommendations 
of 1\1r. Paulson that the cheapest way was to remove 
the roof and put _on a good roof, and in putting on the 
good roof they used all the material :possible from the 
old roof and did the job in the most economical way, (T. 
477). We shall point this out in more detail in ·a 
moment. 
More than a month after the time Mr. Wolfe should 
have been in the building, and on July 8, 194·6, Mr. 
White, Exhibit 1, again wrote Mr. Wolfe, refusing to 
accept responsibility. He said: ''As I have heretofore 
written and informed you, we contend that the lessors 
of the building at 248-5·6 South State Street in this City 
have no liability whatsoever for repair, replacement or 
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change of the roof structure.'' In that letter he did 
not make the contention that he makes in his brief, that 
to keep the roof in good condition and repair Ineant to 
keep it. in the same condition it w·as in at the time the 
lease 'Yas entered into. In that letter he stated: 
"It has al,Yays been our contention that the 
provision, 'the lessors shall have the obligation 
to keep the roof of the leased premises in good 
condition and repair', refers to, and was clearly 
understood by the parties to the lease to refer 
to, repair andjor replacement of the roofing 
material above the roof structure, coinmonly 
referred to as the roof, and ordinarily re:paired 
by a roofer in case of leakage. This is still the 
contention of the lessors of th~ building.'' 
This letter is interesting for tw·o purposes-it shows, 
regardless of ~fr. \"\Thite 's protestations to the contrary 
"\vhen he was on the witness stand, that in July 1946, a 
month after Mr. \\rolfe should have been in the premises, 
he was still insisting !he had no duty to m·ake the roof 
safe. He did not even contend as he does now that at 
the most he had only the obligation to keep the r•oof in 
the same condition it was in when the lease was entered 
into, (whatever that was no ·one knows)_. Then he 
claimed that he was required only to keep the roofing 
material from leaking. It is quite clear from that letter 
that his present position is an afterthought and is only 
a second subterfuge to attempt to avoid complying with 
the express terms of the lease which he quoted verbathn 
in that letter. In his letter of July 8 he s;pecifically de-
nies that it was the duty of the owner to keep· the roof 
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safe. Then belatedly he says, that assumming it was 
his duty, he attaches a letter from Young & Hansen 
stating that if the roof is unsafe it could be made safe 
for $800.00. -Continuing in his letter _he suggests that 
if the building inspector won't issue a permit for re-
modeling until the roof is repaired or replaced, Mr. 
Wolfe's remedy is to p~roceed against the building in-
spector to force the issu'ance of a permit. He also says: 
''It is entirely open to you, therefore, to sub-
mit to the building inspector plans in accordance 
with the suggestions contained in the letter from 
Young & Hansen, and we suggest that you do so.'' 
The letter from .. Young & Hansen which is 'also 
attached to Exhibit 1 and is dated July 8, 1946, says 
that the- roof is amply safe as it is but that it can be 
made- even stronger at a cost not to exceed $800.00, by 
eliminating the skylights. 
"If the skylights are to be eliminated, we sug-
gest the same designed trusses and rafters used 
throughout be placed thru these openings.'' 
In accordance with Mr. White's suggestion to Mr. 
Wolfe that Young & Hansen's proposal be submitted to 
the building inspector, Mr. Wolfe had Mr. Paulson 
draw the blue print attached to Exhibit 1 which con-
tains the proposal to eliminate the skylights by ''frame 
through present skylights with same spacing and same 
trusses as adj-oining'', which is almost the identical 
language -above quoted from Young & Hansen's letter. 
Mr. Paulson drew Exhibits 1 and ''P", which is the 
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sa1ne as Ex. 1, fron1 the information suggested by 
Young & Hansen, and Mr. Gerald Cannon, Wolfe's 
contractor, at Mr. Wolfe's suggestion and in accord-
ance with ~1r. White's request in the letter of July 8, 
submitted the proposal together with Mr. White's 
letter, Mr. Wolfe's letter, and a letter from George S. 
Nelson, hereinafter to be discussed, to the building in-
sp.ector, -and on July 11, 1946, Exhibit "Q", the build-
ing inspector replied that the plan 'vas not acceptable 
and requested additional information and data. Mr. 
Wolfe thus did as Mr. Wltite suggested, and the Y~oung 
& Hansen proposal was not accepted by the public 
authorities. The Young & Hansen proposal never would 
have corrected the condition found in the roof, and as 
a matter of fact, the jury was perfectly justified in dis-
regarding this belated and abortive suggestion with 
respect to the roof. It will be noted that the building 
inspector's letter of July 11 asks for computations, 
strain sheets and stress diagram~. While Mr. ~ite in. 
his testimony s-ays that he hoped that the roof would 
· · be fixed in accordance with the Young & Hanson plan, 
it will be noted that he supplied no strain sheets, etc., 
to he submitted with it. He complains that Mr. Wolfe 
submitted plans without stress charts or ac0ompanying 
data, and that when Mr. Tipton said he required stress 
charts he did nothing to supply them. Mr. White says 
that he asked Mr. Hansen to prepare stress charts but 
that he, Mr. White, did not submit any stress charts 
to Mr. Tip,ton, nor did any one in his behalf, and he 
also admits that he never made any application to Mr. 
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Tipton to repair the roof, ( T. 863). The fact of the 
matter is Young and Hansen were not even empl·oyed 
by Mr. White until the latter part of June, 1946, (T. 
624J. Mr. Hansen said that he made stress charts after 
they got the letter from the building inspector, which 
would be after July 11, but they have been lost and 
couldn't be produced now, ( T. 920) ; that they didn't 
make up others and when asked at the trial to make 
up some new stress charts and to compute the stresses, 
he said he didn't have the formula, and when he was 
offered the formula, he said he didn't care to do it, (T. 
930). Mr. Young of that firm, however, testified that 
they made the stress charts before the ceiling· "\Vas 
removed. Young & Hansen's letter of July 8, says 
the ceiling had been· removed at that time, so the· stress 
charts must have been made before that time, but they 
did not accompany their letter of July 8. Then Mr. 
Young said that they didn't go on with the stress charts 
because the ceiling had been rem·oved, (T. 757, 759). 
He admitted that he didn't submit any stress diagrams, 
and he didn't say anything about stress diagrams in 
his letter of July 8, (T. 760). Mr. Young frankly ad-
mitted that they weren't employed by Mr. White to 
fix the roof. All they were employed to do was to report 
on the safety of the roof, which they did by contradict-
.ing the building inspector, by declaring the roof to be 
safe, ( T. 773). On the witness stand he could not tell 
what the allowable load on the roof was, and stated 
that he didn't make the stress diagram, ( T. 771). If 
one vvas made, it was made by l\Jr. I-Iansen, but it 
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couldn't be produced, and nlr. Hansen refused to at-
tempt to figure the stresses so that '"·e 1night have the 
benefit of his figures for the purprose of cross exanlina-
tion. ~-\.s a matter of fact, the only computed evidence 
concerning stresses and strains \Yas that given by the 
plaintiff's \Yitness, :nlr. George S. Nelson. As to hin1, 
~Ir. Young testified that occasionally they use a struc-
tural eng~ineer in their O"\vn ,, ... ork fro1n outside of their 
own office, and that they use nir. George ~~ elson for 
this purpose. The record is without dispute that neither 
~Ir. \Yhite nor Young & I-Iansen ever submitted any 
stress charts or diagrams to the building authorities 
in compliance with the requirements in Exhibit ''Q''. 
·On August 1, 1946, Exhibit "VV",Mr. White wrote 
to Mr. Wolfe stating: 
"On July 11, the day before I went to Denver, 
I talked to Mr. Tipton, building ins·prector, who 
told me that you had made application to repair 
the roof in accordance with the suggestions of 
Young and Hansen contained in their letter of 
July 8. He read a letter to me which he said he 
was sending to you, but which I have not seen, 
not have I received a copy. This letter sug-
gested that certain stress diagrams be furnished. 
I told Young & Hansen to go ahead with them 
and they are now completed.'' 
This is on August 1, nearly two months after Mr. Wolfe 
should have been in the premises. In this letter of 
August 1 Mr. White declares that if Mr. Wolfe is not 
interested in repairing the roof as suggested by Young 
& Hansen, then there is no use of further discussion. 
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Seven months had gone by since Mr. White first kne'v 
of the unsafe condition of the roof. Mr. Wolfe was then 
two months late in getting into his premises, and Mr. 
White is still insisting that the roof needed nothing 
except the patch-work suggested by Young & Hansen, 
whose stress diagrams, if any, were never submitted 
to the building inspector. No one knows what the stres8 
diagrams were, nor could we find out from either Mr. 
Young or Mr. Hansen, both of whom refused to make 
any computations at the trial. 
Returning now to Mr. White's letter of July 8, we 
find that he made a very interesting suggestion that: 
The way to test the roof structure was to haul up sacks 
'of sand and load them on the roof. 
''We are satisfied · that if such a test is made 
with uniform weight over the span of trusses 
equal to that required by present Salt Lake City 
Building Code (30 pounds per square foot live 
load), that the roof structure will stand, as it 
has stood for over twenty years. * * * If such 
a test is made and the building ins:pector still 
refuses you a permit, then you have your remedy 
against him to force the issuance of such a 
permit." 
Even Young & Hansen admitted that the strength of a 
roof was determined by mathematical computations and 
not by hauling sand up and loading it all over the roof 
to see if it would stand. We suppose that if Mr. White 
could have gotten anyone to haul the sand u~p on the 
roof and take a chance on it, and the roof had fallen 
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in, that he might then concede that the roof was unsafe. 
'': e picture the city authorities hauling sand up t~ the 
top of buildings under construction in the city in order 
to determine w·hether they 'vould stand up. That would 
provide a n1uch larger audience than usually assembles 
to 'Yatch new construction. It would also furnish a 
little business fur the sand and gravel people and mig} 
afford a reason for increasing the payroll of the city 
building inspector. Fortunately, however, it is not 
necessary to resort to such picturesque, laborious and 
hazardous test methods in these days when stresses and 
strains are mathematically computed. It will be inter-
esting to note also from Mr. White's letter that he 
knew or has gained the knowledge from someplace that 
the requirements of the Salt Lake City Building Code 
are 30 pounds per· square foot live load. We suppose 
he got that information from his architects Young & 
Hansen, although Mr. Hansen insisted that although 
you determine stresses by mathematical computation, 
(T. 924), he understood the Code only required 20 
pounds per square foot of live load, ( T. 925). We shall 
discuss this matter in a moment in connection with Mr. 
Nelson's testimony. 
3. THE ACTUAL CONDITION OF THE ROOF. 
Mr. Tipton, the Superintendent of the Bureau of 
Mechanical Inspection, and Mr. Hargraves, the Building 
Inspector, both testified for the plaintiff. The building 
permit for the remodeling of the store which was ap-
plied for in March, was resubmitted by Cannon Con-
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struction Company to include the roof on June 22, 1946, 
but was not issued until July 16, 1946, Exhibit "0". 
Both 1ir. Tipton and Mr. Hargraves made personal 
inspections of the roof. 
The Building Code, Section 201, Exhibits "N'', 
"AA ", and "5 ", specifies that no building shall be 
altered or re:paired without a building permit, Section 
301, that any building found to be dangerous or unsafe 
must be made safe, Section 305, that it shall be unlawful 
for any person to enlarge, alter or repair or occupy 
any building in violation of the Code. (The lease in 
question, paragraph 7, stipulates that the lessees shall 
occupy the premises in a lawful manner.) Section 2305 
of the Building Code provides : 
''Roofs shall be designed for a vertical live 
load of 20 pounds per square foot of horizontal 
projection applied to any and all slopes. * * * 
Where snow loads occur, roofs shall be designed 
for the increase in loading.'' 
This roof, as we have seen, was a flat roof. Section 2522 
of ·the Code provides: 
''Joists su·pporting plastered ceilings shall be so 
proportioned that · their deflection to full live 
load and dead load exclusive of weight of plaster 
shall not exceed lj360th of the span length.'' 
(T. 246.) 
That means not exceeding 1 inch deflection in 30 feet 
of length, ( T. 193). Section 2513 of the Code, particu-
larly Tables A and B on page 138, (T. 322), provides 
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that the allo,vable load is 160 pounds per each 16 penny 
nail in the end connections for nailing me1nbers to other 
members. 
~Ir. Tipton testified that the condition stated in 
Exhibits '\B'' and dC" recited the facts as he found 
them, although those exhibits ·did not state everything 
that could be said about the condition, but simply gen-
eralized the condition, ( T. 244-245). He said that the 
roof was in bad condition; that there ~Nas a sagging or 
deflection of 3 to 4 inches. The trusses, the roof rafters 
and the roof beams \vere deflected. The east-vvest 
beams ,,~ere deflected, as were the east-west trusses ; 
that the allo\Yable deflection is one inch in thirty feet 
and that the deflection here of 3 to 4 inches was in a 
span of about 26 to 27 feet, ( T. 192, 195). The girders 
holding u:p the ceiling joists were undersized ·and bowed. 
The building' permit was finally issued after plans corrl-
plying with the Building Code were submitted, (T. 201). 
Mr. Hargraves a}so examined the roof several 
times. The deflection in the girders ·and ceiling j·oists 
was three times as great as allowed for safety, and he 
considered a degree of failure was taking place, ( T. 
249, 250). The ceiling joists, the roof rafters and trusses 
were in bad condition. They were too light for the span 
they were carrying. Splintering and deterioration had 
been taking place in the joints. The roof did ·not com~ply 
with the standards of safety of the Ordinances, and it 
was unsafe, (T. 251, 252). Subsequent work corrected 
tile. condition and made the roof safe and in compliance 
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of the roof had nothing to do with the ~skylights. It was 
general throughout, (T. 257). The joists and rafters 
throughout the roof were spliced to make them reach 
from the wall to the girders, from girder to girder, and 
from wall to girder, from north to south though the 
building. There were two series of posts running east 
and west carrying the girders. On top of the girders 
were the joists running north and south from the girders 
to the wall. Then there were the rafters above the 
joists held up by trusses and struts, making a trussed 
rafter, ( T. 277, 278). The deflection was general 
throughout the whole ceiling clear from east to west 
throughout the entire store, and the 'Skylights simply 
made it worse, and reinforcing or eliminating the sky-
lights would only correct the condition that existed in 
the skylights and would have nothing to do with the 
remainder of the roof, ( T. 279, 280). After the parti-
tions from the store were removed in 1922 the same 
timbers were used only they were made to reach the 
additional distance required by splicing, and that was 
one reason for the deflection and failure, ( T. 287). 
Mr. Paulson testified that there was three or four 
inches deflection, (T. 295), -and that he employed 
George Nelson, a structural engineer, to design a safe 
roof, ( T. 301). Mr. Nelson, a structural engineer whose 
work is accepted by the building inspector, (T. 211), 
testified concerning his investigations as shown in Ex-
hibit ''F'~, a letter of May 8, 1946. He examined the 
old roof and made the design for the new roof, (T. 311). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
In his investigation he examined the various members 
of the roof and made comparisons between the allo,vable 
load and the actual conditions, (T. 311, 312). The roof 
was a mixed up affair, (T. 314), comprised of trusses, 
rafters about 4 feet apart, and the ceiling joists and 
roof joists above them were spaced about 16 inches 
apart and in between were the trussed rafters. The 
trussed rafters in turn and the ceiling joists rest on 
beams or girders, and then the posts carry on down to 
the footing. This was a slightly sloping roof. The 
trusses ranged in height from 3 feet to about 5 feet. 
This was a flat roof under the Code which requires 
where snow loads occur th·a:t the roof shall be designed 
for an increase in loading which is an increase over 20 
pounds, -and that 30 pounds i·s the accepted minimum 
where snow loads occur and there is a flat roof, ( T. 314, 
316). The allowable load hearing on the posts to con-
form to the Ordinance was 26,300 pounds. This is 
arrived at by multiplying the area at the top of the 
post by 325 pounds which is the unit stress. The actual 
load the girders were carrying if the roof was carrying 
30 pounds live load would be 35,800 pounds, so the 
girders were overstressed 30% in excess of the allow-
able. The posts themselves were all right. The allow-. 
able live load deflection on the east and west girders 
would be 1j3'60th of the s:pan; that is one ·inch to 3'60 
inches or 30 feet; that is the allowable deflection. The 
calculated deflection would on these girders be 30% 
more than that as it existed in the girders, (T. 318, 
320). The trussed rafters were deflected beyond tht~ 
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point of safety. The nailing 1n the trussed rafter& 
under the Ordinance would allow 450 pounds for the 
three 16 penny nails in the end connections. Actually, 
these nails carried 4,650 pounds for the three nails in 
the high trusses· and 6950 pounds for the three nails 
in the low trusses, (T. 322). 
"Now, they-it would he impossible for nails 
to carry this. They were depending on some-
thing, hanging by their teeth or something, and 
the nails couldn't carry that load. There must 
have been some other factor in there holding it 
up. It wasn't those nails. The nails were carry-
ing a load ten times more than allowable." (T. 
322, 323.) 
Eliminating the skylights wouldn't have corrected that 
condition at all. The skylights were badly sagged, and 
while they hadn't ·collapsed, they had failed inasmuch · 
as they had sagged excessively. The roof was unsafe, 
( T. 324). The proposals of Young & Hansen, Exhibits 
1 and '' P'' merely calls for more trusses, like other 
existing trusses, going through the existing skylights, 
and that would not have corrected the unsafe condition, 
(T. 326). The compression members which are the 
struts and trusses w-here the length should not be more 
than fifty times the width were in violation of the Or-
dinance and exceeded the Ordinance allowable, (T. 345, 
347). S·ome of the struts were 10 feet long and some 
longer, when they should have been 6 feet 8 inches or 
6 feet 7 inches, (T. 349). He sent Mr. Wolfe a bill for 
his services of $45.00 which was paid, ( T. 349). 
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)lr. Nelson, as heretofore indieated, \vas employed 
to design the ne\v roof, and on June 17, 1946, he calls 
attention in Exhibit "G", a letter to ~Ir. Wolfe, that 
after his letter of ~_fay 8, Exhibit ''F", he submitted 
two designs for fixing the roof. He states that he has 
been asked if the present roof could be made safe \Yi th-
out removing it. He says it could be but in his opinion 
the cost of doing this \Votlld cost more than to remov8 
the roof completely and- rebuild it reusing much of the 
present material; that trying to repair the old roof in 
place would cost more than rebuilding from a fresh 
start. On June 14, 1946, Mr. Paulson in a letter to Mr. 
Wolfe, Exhibit "E", says that it would cost more to 
open up the entire area and_ make it safe than to remove 
the lpTesent roof and put in a good roof; that the esti-
mated cost for a new roof without posts would be some 
$2,000.00 more than the estimated costs of using the 
present columns with new beams and a new roof. 
The condition of this roof is graphically illustrated 
by the pictures, and at random we reached into the 
Exhibits and came up with five of them numbered 
"A-A-A" to "E-E-E'' inclusive. We find from the 
record that Mr. Nelson rather graphically !J'ointed out 
the weaknesses of the roof from these exhibits in his 
testimony when he was recalled towards the end of 
the trial. The defendants' witness, Mr. Miles Miller, 
had attempted to compute the stresses while on the 
witness stand and had come up with the most absurd 
answers, and the other experts _for the defendants, 
Young & I-Iansen, had refused to attempt to make stress 
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computations, so Mr. Nelson in the court room refigured 
his ·computations showing stress of 4890 pounds com-
pression in the end struts and diagonal struts, and a 
tension of 4590 pounds in the end member of the bottom 
cord, which means that you would have to have thirty 
16 penny nails in these timbers to carry the load. This 
testimony was in answer to the defendants' witnesses 
that the additional nails could be put in to hold the 
timbers. Mr. Nelson showed by his computation that 
the boards wouldn't hold the thirty 16 penny nails, ( T. 
941). Also, the timbers themselves were overstrained 
and deflected more than three times the allowable. The 
stresses th-at a member can carry is not ·a matter of 
opinion. It is ·something that can be calculated. It is 
factual. They can be computed, and that is what the 
witness did. Nor would the timbers carry sufficient 
bolts to sustain the load. As the pictures show, some 
of the timbers were .split, others were full of knot holes. 
They did not meet fo form a real truss, and if you used 
three-fourths inch bolts, which is the maximum size 
you could use in such a connection, it would require 
nine three-quarter inch bolts, -and you couldn't possibly 
get more than three in there under the best of circum-
tances, (T. 952, 954). Exhibit ''A-A-A" shows how the 
diagonal members do not meet the uprights, shows the 
splicing of the joists with no support thereunder, and 
shows the deflection. Exhibit ''C-C-C'' shows the split 
in the timbers, as also does Exhibit "D-D-D", and the 
latter exhibit shows the knot holes. Exhibit ''Q-Q" is 
taken from the bottom and shows the patch work con-
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struction of the joists ":hich ":as uniform throug·hout 
the entire roof. Three of the skylights appear in Ex-
hibit ~'E-E", and it can readily be seen that eliminating 
the skylights would in no sense rectify the condition of 
the roof. See also Exhibit "C-C ". 
There was a good deal of discussion from Mr. 
Ramm Hansen, one of defendants' witnesses, about the 
effectiveness of a Howe truss. The true I-Iowe truss 
consists of uprights and diagonals joining the joists at 
the bottom and supporting the rafters at the top, and 
each of the members meet to form ·a supp·ort for each 
other. Not only do the pictures show that there are 
no _true Howe trusses, but Mr. Don C. Young, another 
of defendants' witnesses and a partner of Mr. Hansen, 
when asked if he could find a true Howe truss in the 
entire roof replied: ''I suppose in all that mess you 
might find a truss.'' No one in the case more aptly 
described the roof than Mr. Young, who called it a 
mess, (T. 986). 
4. WHAT WAS DONE TO MAKE THE ROOF SAFE. 
Mr. Gerald Cannon, the owner of the Cannon Con-
'Struction Com:pany, testified that he was at first em-
ployed to remodel the store front, and nothing was said 
about the roof, but almost simultaneously with signing 
the contract, Exhibit "U-U", May 7, 1946, he was 
asked to submit figures for fixing the roof, (T. 459).· He 
understood when he made the contract that Mr. Wolfe 
was to take occupancy the first of June, (T. 457). He 
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told Mr. Wolfe that he could complete the alterations 
in sixty days, by the first of August, or shortly there-
after, :and if they could have proceeded vvith the work, 
they could have finished it by that time. This was only 
the remodeling of the store front, ( T. 460, 461). Ho,v-
ever, he was then asked to submit :figures on the roof, 
and he made estimates of the cost of fixing the roof. 
He made two estimates of two n1ethods and submitted 
them to Mr. 'Volfe. They made an estimate of removing 
the roof structure and eli~in~ting the columns and 
spanning from north vvall to south wall with a series 
of bow string trusses and then rebuilding the roof by 
_ salvaging all possible lumber. The estimate of this cost 
was $11,021.00. The alternate plan was to remove the 
roof structure including the longitudinal beams whic:O. 
supported the truss rafters by utilizing the existing 
columns and replacing or placing new beams of steel 
on top of the wooden columns and building wood trusses 
from beam to beam and from beam to wall and using 
the existing :posts, and the estimate of this cost was 
$8,500.00. Using steel instead of W·ood did not increase 
the cost at all. Lumber was very difficult to get and 
was not any cheaper, (T. 462, 464). They finally adopted 
the clear span bow string truss roof, and the additional 
cost was in eliminating the posts, (T. 464). They pro-
ceeded with the work under the contract, "U-U", which 
has a provision in it which allowed them to ~proceed 
with any additional w·ork directed by the owner or 
architect. He was the contractor who did the work 
from beginning to end, ( T. 464). 
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Before doing the work ,he made an inspection, and 
after he had rnade his estimates he sa\v the roof and 
inspected and examined it many times. The ceiling was 
very badly sagg·ing generally throughout the building, 
and there was an apparent distortion in the longitudinal 
beams running east and west. The vvater wouldn't drain 
off of the roof because there was a sag in the roof, (T. 
465, 466), and every horizontal member practically in 
the structure ''was sagging, cracked and split at the 
splices. The roof was just generally-the whole struc-
ture was in very bad shape.'' The timbers had come 
loose from the members quite extensively, (T. 466). The 
worst sagging, of course, was in the middle of the spans 
and at the skylights. They ran strings which show· the 
sagging, (T. 467, 468), and these are shown in the 
pictures. The witness particularly called attention to 
Exhibits ''H-H" "0-0" "Q-Q" "T-T" "E-E" etc 
' ' ' . ' ' ., (T. 471, 474). 
There was no practical way of repairing the struc-
ture which wouldn't co.st as much and maybe more than 
to take the structure off and replace it with a new 
structure, (T. 476), so they removed the whole roof 
structure and built a new roof, .and the way in which 
they did it was the best in his judgment because it was 
cheaper. They utilized all the old wood they could, 
reused the sheathing, and salvaged as much as they 
could and reused it, ( T. 4 77, 4 78). 
Before they could finish the store front they had 
to finish the roof, and because of the extra work of 
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finishing the roof, they did not get done until the middle 
of November. Part of the additional time was due to 
stoppage of the work, (T. 478). 
(Mr. Wolfe testified that the reason the work was 
stopped was because Mr. White asked him to hold it up 
so that he could make an independent examination. This 
was in June, and he stopped the work and didn't go any 
further. Mr. White made this same reque·st on another 
occasion in July, (T. 564, 565). He had the work held 
up at Mr. White's request until after he got the letter 
from Mr. White telling him that he. had made the inde-
!P~endent examination and enclosing the Young & Hansen 
letter, Exhibit 1, (T. 566). Mr. White gave him rio fur-
ther plans with reference to the roof and so far as he 
knows made no further effort to fix it, (T. 567). On 
August 1 he received the letter from Mr. White, Ex-
hibit ''V-V'', which was the next time he heard from 
Mr. White after the communication of July 1. The 
letter refers to stress diagrams, but they were never 
supplied to him.) 
Mr. Cannon had prepared a memorandum of the 
actual cost of fixing this roof which is shown on Ex-
hibit "B-B", (T. ~80). This shows the actual cost of 
fixing the roof, and the costs have been segregated 
from his records from all other work that he did, (T. 
482, 483), and the fair and reasonable cost of fixing 
the roof was. $13,679.56, (T. 487). (The cost of photo-
·gra;phs was eliminated from this figure in Exhibit ''B-
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not include the extra cost of constructing a clear span 
roof which is shown on Exhibit ''D-1'' to have been 
eliminated in the -sum of $2,224.94. This sum was ar-
rived at after the roof had been completed and the 
costs had been determined. It was another estimate 
after the work was done of the difference in the co8t 
between the clear span and the beam and trusses and 
trussed rafter method, so that $13,593.37 is the fair 
and reasonable cost for the work and labor on the roof 
and does not include the cost of th-e clear span con-
struction, (T. 487). The estimates he had previou-sly 
made of $11,021.00 as against $8500.00 were before the 
work was done. The figures he has just given are the 
figures computed after the work was done, (T. 488). 
The clear sp·an construction as against u-sing the 
posts was not decided upon until June, 1946, (T. 963). 
(THE DRAIN) 
It will be noted that in appellants' brief they make 
quite a point even to the extent of a sub-heading of 
"The Drain System", page 34. Lest the Court get 
the impression that the drain was a matter independent 
of the roof, we call attention to the fact that the only 
thing the defendants were charged with so far as the 
drain is concerned was $55.72 which, of course, was 
the fixing of the drain in connection with the fixing of 
the roof, Exhibit "B-B". 
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5. PLAINTIFFS' DAMAGES AND THE VERDICT 
OF THE JURY. 
The Court instructed the jury that if we were 
entitled to recover at all, we could only recover what 
was reasonably necessary to put the roof in good con-
dition and repair, and that we were obliged to use the 
most efficient and economical means possible and prac-
ticable under the circumstances and could im:pose no 
liability -upon the defendants more than the actual and 
necessary costs of so placing the roof in good condition 
and repair; ( T. 151) ; that the defendants, if responsible 
at all, would be responsible only for such delay as they 
unreasonably and unnecessarily caused by their con-
duct, ( T. 152) ; that the damages, if any, could not ex-
ceed the sum of $13,54 7 .89, .for placing the roof in good 
condition and repair, (T. 153), phis any damage occa-
sioned by reason of unreasonable and unnecessary delay 
caused by defendants' conduct by which the plaintiffs 
were prevented from occupying the store and which 
plaintiffs contend caused them to have to pay monthly 
' 
and excess percentage rental that they would not other-
wise have to pay and which they claim lost them an 
opportunity to sublease the store, but the damages, if 
any, with respect to said amounts could not exceed for 
monthly rental on the old store $1125.00, for excess 
percentage rental on the old store of $2856.84, for loss 
of rental because of failure to sublease the old store 
$1500.00, (T. 154) (the amounts set forth in Exhibit 
''D-1 "). 
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The Court g·ave the jury the forms of verdict 
allo"'"ing then1 to find for the :plaintiffs or defendants. 
The jury selected the verdict finding the issues in favor 
of the plaintiffs, (T. 165). This verdict allovved them 
to fix damages in five separate iten1s: (1) With respect 
to putting the roof in good condition and repair; (2) 
With respect to additional monthly rental on the old 
store: (3) ''Tith respect to loss of rental and loss of 
. opportunity to sublease the old store; ( 4) vVith respect 
to excess percentage rental paid by the plaintiffs on the 
old store; and (5) With respect to attorneys' fees. The 
amount to be found \Yas left blank in each- instance. The 
jury returned a verdict: (1) With respect. to putting 
the roof in good condition and repair, $12,893.83 ; ( 2) 
With respect to additional monthly rental on the old 
store, $2,400.00, (the court had instructed the jury that 
they could not find on this item in excess of $1,125.00) ; 
(3) With respect to loss of rental and loss of oppor-
tunity to sublease the old store, $1,500.00; ( 4) With 
respect to excess percentage rental paid by the plain-
tiffs on the old store, none; and ( 5) With respect to 
attorneys' fees, $3,000.00. 
The appellants raise no point as to the amount of 
the verdict with res:pect to putting the roof in good 
condition and repair except as it might be contended. 
that their points I and II, which argue that we were 
entitled to nothing might raise that point, or their 
point III, under which they seem to infer but not to 
claim positively, that the jury should have been in-
structed that the $800.00 proposed by Young & Hansen 
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rplus $500.00 for extra nailing, plus $485.86 for the 
drain, pages 64 and '65 of their brief, should be specific-
ally taken into consideration in fixing the reasonable 
cost of putting the roof in good condition and repair. 
The trial court, we think, very properly refused to 
single out particular items, but instructed th~ jury, as 
we have shown, that we could only recover what was 
reasonably and necessarily required to put the roof in 
good condition and repair as economically as p~ossible. 
Obviously, the jury did not believe that the defendants' 
belated subterfuge would either put the roof in good 
condition or was a reasonable cost of doing so as is 
evidenced by the verdict. There was no more reason 
for the court to single out specific items claimed by 
the defendants than there would have been to single 
out specific items of expenditure made by the plaintiffs 
in putting the roof in good condition and repair. Ob-
viously, had the jury felt. that the $1,785.56 suggested 
by the defendants at the trial, but never prior to that 
time, to be the reasonable cost of repairing the roof, 
they would have so found. It will be noted that the 
defendants put in an item of $485.56 for the drain, 
whereas, we only charged them $55.72, as shown by 
Exhibit "B-B". The jury evide_ntly believed the plain-
tiffs' witnesses that trussing the skyl~ghts and putting 
thirty 16 penny nails or nine three-quarter inch bolts in 
each of these connecting joints was neither feasible nor 
would it have corrected the unsafe condition of the roof. 
We discuss. point III of appellants' brief later in con-
sidering their brief. With respect to ·item 5, the 
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$3,000.00 attorneys' fees, no question whatever is raised 
on that, and ":-e pass that with the remark that there 
was no conflict in the evidence that $3,000.00 was a 
reasonable fee. 
On items 2 and 3 of the verdict the court on its own 
motion reduced item 2 to $1,125.00, (T. 166), and item 
3 he eliminated entirely on defendants' motion, (T. 173). 
The trial court reduced the p~laintiffs' judgment in the 
sum of $2,775.00. Thus, the judgment instead of being 
$19,793.83 as rendered by the jury, is only $17,018.83 
as reduced by the trial court. The court on the back of 
the judgment, (T. 166), ordered that interest on item 1 
should be added from February 1, 1947, and on item 2 
from January 1, 1947. Originally,. he allowed interest 
on item 3 from April 1, 1946, but later struck that out 
as is shown on the back of the judgment. 
Prior to occupying the premises in question here 
the plaintiffs were occupying property at 224-226 South 
State Street under a lease from the Joseph J. Snell 
Estate. Mr. Wolfe advised Mr. White of the terms of 
this lease of which Exhibit "W-W'' is a renewal, (T. 
965-968). Prior to signing the lease with Mr. White, 
Mr. Wolfe had many conversations with Mr. White 
with reference to his lease on the Snell property and 
told him that he, Mr. Wolfe, was ipaying percentage 
rentals, and at the same time he told Mr. White about 
the terms of the lease and the duration of it, (T. 965, 
967). "Prior to the signing of the new lease with Mr. 
White, I advised him as to how long I had to go yet, 
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and the terms of the lease. He \Yas informed of that'', 
(T. 968). The lease, ''W-W' ', was in 1945 and is a 
renewal and continuation of the Snell lease in effect at 
the time of his conversations with Mr. White, (T. 968, 
969). 
Mr. Wolfe should have gotten into his premises 
June 7, 1946, under the lea~e in question, paragraph 3, 
and he did not get in until November 7, 1946. Accord-
ing to the evidence of Mr. Cannon above referred to, 
the store front could have been remodeled by August 
-1, so that there was a three month delay due to fixing 
the roof during which three months Mr. Wolfe had to 
pay rent under the new lease and rent under his old 
lease which provided for a monthly rental of $500.00, 
less $125.00 he received from sub-letting, making a flat 
rental of $375.00 plus an additional rental of 2%% of 
all sales over $170,00Q.OO and up to $200,000.00, and if 
over $200,000.00 2% of all sales over that figure, ( T. 
570 and paragr3lph first of Exhibit "W-W"). Mr. Wolfe 
paid his rent under the old lease up to and including 
March 31, 1947. Had he been able to move from them, 
he had the old premises subleased commencing with 
the 1st of August, 1946, (T. 572), to a Mr. Chandler, 
who testified, (T. 530), that he was ready and willing 
to take over the occupancy of the old building August 1 
but was unable to get i~to the building and so went 
elsewhere. Mr. Chandler went into the business of what 
is called Jack and Jill Shop, and Wolfe's arrangement 
for him to take over the old premises fell through, (T. 
574) and he was unable to rent them later, although 
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he made an effort to do so, (T. 575, 576). Wolfe him-
self had to pay rent on the old preinises up to ~rarch 31, 
1947, a period of eight months at $375.00 a month, (T. 
576). He paid a percentage gross rental as long as he 
" .. as in the old premises up to November 6 and also paid 
1Ir. White rents for the same period as he paid rental 
on the old premises. This percentage rental frorn 
August 1 to November 9 amounted to $2,856.84, Ex-
hibit "D-1 ", so that for the three months he actually 
occupied the old premises (August to November 7, 
1946), Mr. Wolfe paid a base rental of ·$1125.00 and a 
percentage rental of $2856.84, and a rental for five 
months, November, December, January, February and 
March of $375.00 on the old store while he was out of 
occupation, or a total of $1875.00, for which we asked 
only $1500.00 in Exhibit ''D-1". Thus the total rental 
he paid on the old store when he should have been in 
the new one amounted to $5,481.84. Mr. White at the 
time the lease here in question was made knew of the 
Snell lease its duration and terms, -and knew that Mr. 
Wolfe would have to p-ay the rent on that place unless 
Mr. Wolfe could sublease it. He also knew that Mr. 
Wolfe could not sublease it as long as he was in the 
premises and occupying them. The jury :allowed us by 
its verdict $3900.00 in items 2 and 3 for monthly rental 
we had to pay at the old store when we should have 
been in the new one. While item No. 2 is for $2400.00 
instead of $1125.00 in accordance with the instruction, 
(T. 154), and nothing under item 4 with reference to 
excess percentage rentals, it is quite obvious that the 
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jury by items 2 and 3 intended to allow us $3900.00, 
although our actual damage was $5,481.84, for rental we 
had to ;pay on the old store when we should have been 
in the new store. The jury's verdict of $3900 on the 
two items, 2 and 3, is $1581.84 less than the actual 
damage we sustained. The trial court instead of giving 
effect to the verdict as he had the right and duty to do, 
reduced the $2400.00 to $1125.00 and later struck- out 
the entire item 3, the $1500.00 for the months of Novem-
ber, December, January and February, so that all we 
were allowed by the judgment for the rental we had 
to pay and which we did pay at the old store when we 
should have been in the new one and could not get in 
due to the fault of the defendants, was $1125.00, a loss 
to us of $4,356.84 in money we actual~y paid out because 
of defendants' breach of the lease, and a loss of 
$2,775.00 in the amount the jury found we were entitled 
to. 
6. THE EVIDENCE O·N DEFENDANTS' POINT III, 
PAGE 63 OF THEIR BRIEF. 
The defendants offered Miles E. Miller, Don C. 
Young and Ramm Hansen as expert architects to testify 
with reference to the roof. Mr. Miller is the architect 
who in 1922 designed the roof that was in 1946 pro-
nounced unsafe by the building inspector. He testified 
that the requirements of the building inspector were 
entirely superfluous, and that he was entirely wrong, 
( T. 691), ~and when the building ins!pector said the roof 
wasn't safe he was "wrong", or "wet", (T. 692). He 
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said that originally there were five stores with their 
separating partitions supporting the roof, (T. 696); 
that he took out all the partitions and used the existing 
joists and made them fit by splicing every joist, ( T. 699). 
He frankly ·admitted that the construction in 1922 
doesn't now comply with the present Building Code, 
(T. 719). He also said that regardless of what the 
building inspector required he wouldn't have touched 
the skylights or anything, (T. 724), but that if Mr. 
White wanted it fixed, all he had to do was to tell Mr. 
Miller to go ahead and fix the roof, and he would have 
done it, (T. 725). 
Mr. White frankly admitted that he didn't tell any 
of these people to go ahead and fix the roof. He inter-
preted the lease to mean that it wasn't his legal obliga-
tion to make structural repairs, and he didn't intend to 
do it, (T. 867); that after he got Tipton's letter in 
January, he didn't do anything but write the letters we 
have heretofore called attention to, (T. 874), .and from 
April 5 to June 7 he never did anything. He relied on 
Wolfe to go ahead, (T. 876). 
Young & Hansen wrote the letter of July 8 pro-
posing to truss through the skylights, and while they 
say that later on in July they made stress diagrams for 
the building inspector, they were never submitted either 
to Mr. Wolfe or the building inspector. They could not 
be :produced at the trial, and both gentlemen refused 
to compute the actual loads carried by the roof when 
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requested to do so at the trial, although Mr. l'~elson 
offered to furnish them the formula, and Mr. Nelson 
himself actually did compute them at the trial. 
That the defendants' contention that the roof could 
he fixed for $1785.56 is a pure after-thought is apparent 
from the defendants' answer, ( T. 73-82). In t4at answer 
the defendants contended that they had had the building 
·examined by Young & Hansen on July 8 and that Young 
& Hansen found the roof to be safe and in good condi-
tion, but if the skylights were to be eliminated the cost 
would not exceed $800.00, (T. 78), and that plaintiffs 
should go ahead and perform that work; that at the 
time the plaintiffs removed the old roof structure the 
same was in good condition and repair, (T. 80), "Where-
fore, defendants :pray that plaintiffs take nothing by 
reason of their complaint." It is perfectly obvious that 
the proposition of fixing the drain for $485.56 and 
nailing or bolting the loose joints for $500.00 occurred 
after the answer was filed, after the work was all done, 
and after the defendants admittedly had refused to do 
anything even with respect to the $800.00 but had told 
the plaintiffs to go ahead and do it. The evidence is so 
overwhelming that th-e proposal of Young & Hansen 
was neither acceptable to the building inspector as it 
did not comply with the Building Code, nor would it in 
fact have made the roof safe, that it is no wonder the 
jury disreg·arded it. 
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ERRORS RELIED UPON 
- 1. The Court erred in not haYing the jury correct 
its verdict and in not correcting it himself so as to 
allow . us to recover the amounts '\Ye actually lost as 
found by the jury '\Yhich '\Yere less than the amounts 
that we actually did lose. 
2. The Court erred in eliminating item No. 3 of 
$1500.00 from the jury's verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO RECOVER. 
In its decision herein, 197 P~ac. (2) 125, this Court 
held that the plaintiffs' complaint stated a eause of 
action. The evidence established the allegations of the 
plaintiffs' complaint, and under the evidence the jury 
found for the plaintiffs. The jury's verdict established: 
(1) That the roof of the leased premises was not kept 
in good condition and repair by ~he defendants; (2) 
That the defendants failed and refused to keev· said 
roof in good condition and repair; (3) That the defend-
ants knew the roof was not in good condition and repair 
and failed to put it in good condition and repair; ( 4) 
That the plaintiffs adopted reas·onable and necessary 
plans and methods to put the roof in good condition 
and repair, and that the amount found in item 1 of the 
verdict was the necessary and reasonable amount re-
quired to put the roof in good condition and repair as 
economically as possible, said amount being $12,893.83; 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
and (5) That plaintiffs were damaged otherwise by the 
acts of the defendants by reason of having to pay rental 
on the old store in the sum of $3900.00, and $3,000.00 
attorneys' fees. 
The jury's verdict is supported by the testimony 
which establishes: That the lease was entered into 
February 19, 1945, but plaintiff had no duty or obliga-
tions and no rights thereunder until June 7, 1946; that 
for the entire term of the lease from February 19, 1945 
to May 31, 195.6, the lessors had the obligation to keep 
the roof of the ·leased p·remises in good condition ~and 
repair; that in January, 1946, the building authorities 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, notified the defendant James 
L. White in writing that the roof was not safe and that 
it must he made safe; that the defendants denied any 
obligation to make the roof safe or to rectify the con-
. ditions objected to by the public authorities of Salt Lake 
City; that the roof was in fact unsafe in January, 1946, 
and was not in good condition and repair at that time; 
that the plaintiffs repeatedly called to the attention of 
the defendants that the roof was not in good condition 
and repair in January, 1946, and thereafter, and called 
upon the defendants to fix the roof; th.a.t the defendants 
failed and refu-sed to do so, although they had at least 
five months within which to undertake said work; that 
the plaintiffs thereupon submitted plans and proposals 
to the public authorities which were accepted and which 
were Code complying for fixing the roof and did fix the 
roof in the cheapest and most economical manner; that 
by reason of the failure and refusal of the defendants 
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to fix the roof the plaintiffs were damaged in the 
amounts sho,vn by the verdict. That these amounts 
were expended and these losses incurred is not disputed 
and the foregoing evidence is without substantial con-
flict except that defendants make some .argument that 
they made counter ... proposals for fixing the roof on 
July 8, 1946, a month after plaintiffs should have been 
in possession of the premises, but the evidence shows 
that the proposals of the defendants were not accept-
able to the public authorities, and defendants in fact 
did nothing at any time in actually fixing the roof, but 
did make suggestions that the plaintiffs do so; that 
defendants expected that the plaintiffs would go ahead 
and fix the roof. The decision of this Court established: 
''The general rule is : In the absence of a 
covenant on the part of the lessee to re.p·air the 
leased premises as required by public authority 
or to make alterations or improvements required 
by public authority, that obligation falls upon 
the shoulders of the landlord.'' (P. 130.) 
There was no such covenant. on the part of the less~e, 
so it was defendants' obligation to comply with the re-
quirements of the public authorities. . Not only w~as 
there no obligation on the part of the lessee, but, -as this 
Court said: 
"The law in this case, we think, is strengthen-
ed by the terms of paragraph 8 specifically plac-
ing responsibility for the roof on the shoulders 
of the lessor." (P. 131.) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
46 
This Court also pointed out: 
''The lessees alleged that they we.re unable to 
get lessors to remedy the situation and therefore 
did the work themselves. They ask for reimburse-
ment for those expenditures, for damages and 
attorneys' fees. The letters fro1n the Salt Lake 
City Bureau of Mechanical Inspection to lessees' 
architect and to one of the lessees, from 'vhich 
we have quoted above, are incorporated as part 
of the pleadings. The lease is also made part of 
the pleadings.'' (P. 130.) 
The lessees ·proved and the jury found that ''they were 
unable to get the lessors to remedy the situation, and 
therefore did the work themselves.'' The evidence 
shows and the jury found ·the amount of lessees' ex-
penditures, damages and attorneys' fees, and the jury's 
verdict gave reimbursement to the plaintiffs for those 
items. The letters from the S~alt Lake Bureau of Me-
chanical Inspection are in evidence, and the Sup·erin-
tendent of the Bureau of Mechanical Inspection and 
the City Inspector testified that the letters were true 
and that the condition of the roof was even w,orse than 
the letters indica ted. This Court also said: 
"It is to he noted that at no time in either of 
the letters is there any determination as to when 
the condition first developed or how long it had 
existed. The nature of the defect is not such as 
to indicate the time of its develo!pment. Approxi-
mately eleven months passed from the time of 
signing of the lease before any indication came 
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that there were defects In the roof." (P. 130-
131.) 
The evidence shows that Mr. Miles Miller constructed 
the roof; that while he claims it was Code conforming 
.at the time, he also admitted that it was not Code con-
forming now. The roof under present day standards 
is improperly constructed. '''hen it commenced to sag 
is not known, but obviously it would not improve any 
with the passing of time. Neither party to the lease 
inspected the roof or knew of its condition at the time 
of the signing of the lease. In October of 1945, eight 
months after the signing of the lease, the defendant 
James L. White assured the plaintiff that the roof was 
in excellent shape, and one of his _witnesses, B. T. C:an-
non, testified that at that time, October 1945, the roof 
was in good condition. Certainly it was not in good 
condition in the following January. If defendant and 
his own witness are to be believed, the sagging occurred 
in the interval. We alleged that in January, 1946, we 
first learned that the roof was actually dangerous and 
unsafe, and that it was not in good condition and repair 
in January, 1946, and became progressively worse so 
that when we were to take physical pos·session of the 
property the roof -was unsafe and dangerous to life 
and limb. We set out the exact defects and then alleged: 
''and on or about June 7, 1946, by reason of said 
conditions the roof had become dangerous and 
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unsafe. * * * that plaintiffs do not know whem 
t,he said roof firs.t became dangerous and unsafe, 
but said unsafe condition became p~rogressively 
worse from the date of the lease~" (Italics add-
ed.) 
These pTovisions of our complaint are quoted by this 
Court on page 131. This Court on the same page says : 
"The pleadings obviously refer to conditions 
after the execution of the lease.'' 
This definitely was established because at the time of 
the execution of the lease we didn't know anything about 
the condition of the roof, and our pleadings refer to 
conditions we discovered after the execution of the 
lease. This Court then points out that it w~as only f.or 
the last ten years of the lease that we had any obliga-
tion, which period would not commence until June 7, 
1946, which would be more than five months after .the 
discovery of the unsafe and dangerous conditions by us. 
The writer of the opinion was inclined to believe that 
the exception stated in paragraph 6 with regard to our 
obligations, 
''is an exception to 'all improvements, upkeep 
and repairs of every kind and nature whatso-
ever, regardless of the extent thereof and whether 
the same be ordinary or extraordinary,' and 
would authorize, as an exclusion from this over-
all duty of the Lessees, the- ·p,rovisions of para-
graph 8 (quoted) as to the roof. There is, how-
ever, a reason why it is unnecessary to decide 
this point.'' 
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The writer then proceeds to speak for the C.ourt that 
the lessees' obligation did not mature until after May 
31, 1946: 
''The condition of the roof of which complaint 
is made developed prior to that time ; and the 
obligation of correcting it arose prior to that 
time. With this provision out of the way by 
reason of its lack of maturity, we have a situa-
tion wherein at the time of the discovery of the 
defect .the Lessees had not undertaken repairs 
or changes incident to any cause. The law we 
have cited above :places the burden as to require-
ments by building authorities under such circum-
stances on the shoulders of the Lessor.'' ( P. 131.) 
The Court then rejects defendants' contention that only 
ordinary repairs were contemplated, and calls attention 
to the fact that the lease provides that -the roof shall 
· · be kept in good condition, but that even the word 
"repair" has a relative meaning. 
''There is implicit in the maintenance of any 
part of a building the purpose for which that 
part is intended to function. * * * A faulty con-
struction or remodeling of the roof may lead to 
quicker wearing out, but it- doesn't change the 
meaning of 'repair'." (P. 131-132.) 
This Court thus has already squarely rejected the de-
fendants' arguments (repeated and reasserted in their 
present brief), and has held squarely that it w·as the 
obligation of the defendants to vut the roof in good 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
50 
condition and to comply with the requirements of the 
public authorities; that at the time the requirements 
were made we had no obligations; that our obligationH, 
if any, did not mature until months later, and that if 
we were unable to get lessors to remedy the situation 
and did the work ourselves, we had a right to reim-
bursement for those expenditures and for damages and 
attorneys' fees. This Court concludes: 
''We are of the opinion that the demurrer to 
the complaint should have been overruled.'' 
' 
We established all the allegations of our complaint. 
As a matter of fact, it makes no difference· when the 
roof first got out of good condition and repair. The 
pertinent fact is that the lessors agreed that from Feb-
ruary 19, 1945, until May 31, 1956, they would keep the 
roof in good condition and repair; that in January, 
1946, and on June 7, 1946, when we were to take posses-
sion the roof was not in good condition and. repair; ex-
pressly under the lease we had no duty with regard to 
the roof at either time. The defendants. fail to point 
out whose duty it was to fix the roof in J!anuary, 1946. 
This C·ourt has said it was their duty, and the evidence 
overwhelmingly establishes that it was not in good 
condition and repair. Having established all the allega-
tions of our complaint, we have under the decision of 
this Court established our right to recover. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT \VAS IN ERROR IN REDUCING 
ITEM 2 OF THE VERDICT FROM $2400.00 TO $1125.00 
AND FROM ELIMINATING ITEJ.VI 3 OF $1500.00 FROM 
THE JUDGMENT. 
In the complaint '""e prayed for the total sum o.f 
$24,693.89, ( T. 7) ~ ''T e did not segregate the damage 
but asked for that amount '""hich included all ·damages 
and attorneys' fees. For the sake of convenience we 
itemized these damages in Exhibit "D-1" to show that 
the actual cost of the roof was $13,4 77 .89, and the actual 
damage to us by having to pay rent on the old store 
when we should have been in the new store was $5,481.84, 
consisting of rental paid while still occupying the 
rpremises of 3 months hase rental of $1125.00 plus 
$2856.84 percentage rental, and $1500.00 base rental for 
the 4 months we had to pay after we vacated, and that 
the attorneys' fees were $3,000.00. There was no legal 
principle that required us thus to separately state these 
damages. Those items all come under the same rule of 
damages, and they were set up, thusly merely for con-
venience in understanding .of what they consisted. The 
fact that the court segregated them in the verdict to 
the jury in the same manner we had listed them in the 
Exhibit ''D-1'', which was only f.or the purpose of 
itemization and distinguishing the various periods, does 
not change the rule of law which was correctly announced 
by the court in instruction No. 14, ( T. 154), that if we 
were prevented from occupying the store and by reason 
thereof were compelled to pay monthly and excess per-
centage rent and lost ~an opportunity to sublease the 
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store, we should be allowed such damages as naturally 
and directly flowed from the breach of their covenant 
by the defendants. The Court also directed the jury 
that such damages also must be such as the parties 
would reasonably have contemplated, if, at the time the 
lease was made, their attention had been called to the 
natural and direct consequences of such a breach of 
such covenant of the lease. This latter instruction put 
more of a burden on us than ;p-roper, but the jury found 
for us anyway. In the form of verdict the court segre-
gated the damages in accordance with the itemization 
of Exhibit "D-1". In instruction No. 14 the court also 
segregated the items, but while there are three segre-
gations, (items 2, 3 and 4), there are only two sums to 
be accounted for-(1) the monthly rental for the old 
store actually paid in base and excess percentage rental 
while we were in occupation, and (2) for rental for 4 
months when we. were not in occupation and which we 
rpiaid. We were unable to sublease because we couldn't 
put the subtenants into possession timely. The rent 
actually paid while in occupation is covered by items 2 
and 4 of the verdict. The rent while we were not in 
occupation- is item 3 of the verdict. The jury returned 
a verdict for $2,400.00 under item No. 2 of the verdict 
"with respect to additional monthly rental on the old 
store we render our verdict in favor of the plaintiffs 
and a~ainst the defendants in the sum of $2,400.00", 
as distinguished from item 3 of $1500.00 "with respect 
to loss of rental and loss of opportunity to sub-lease the 
old store.'' The only period we could sublease was the 
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four months \Ye were not in occupation. It is quite 
obvious that the jury intended to allo\v us under item 2 
more than merely- the base rental of $375.00 a month 
for August, September and October, and that the dif-
ference between $1125.00 base rental for those months 
·and $2400.00, to-\\'it, $1,27-5.00, '\Yas the jury's idea of 
how much of the percentage rentals we should be al-
lowed to recover because after allowing us the $2,400.00 
in item No. 2, which is in excess of the base rentals of 
$375.00 a month, they allowed us nothing for the ~per­
centage rentals. This was perfectly proper under the 
evidence because we actually did pay $2,400.00, to-wit, 
$3,981.84, additional monthly rental on the old store 
while we were in actual occup~ation. By allowing us the 
$2,400.00 in item No. 2 and not allowing us anything 
in item No. 4 the jury indicated and_ returned a verdict 
in our favor for that amount as distinguish·ed from our 
damages by reason of our inability to sublease the 
premises for the months of November, December, Janu-
ary and February, at $375.00 ~a month, when we were 
not in occupation, which sum they allowed us in itein 
No. 3 of the verdict in the sum of $1500.00. 
We contend, therefore, that it was the duty of the 
trial court when the jury brought in the verdict in the 
manner they did to have segregated the amounts him-
self if that was desireable, although such a segregation 
was not necess,ary. Whether the rental wa·s paid as a 
base rental or as a percentage rental, it was all for the 
same period and is recoverable under the same rule of 
damages. The court had the right, if such a segrega-
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tion was necessary, which it was not, or desirable, which 
it may have been in view of the itemization in Exhibit 
'' D-1 '' and in the verdict, either to have the jury make 
the segregation or to have done so himself. There ls 
no rule of law that makes the percentage rentals paid 
by us any different than the base rentals we paid during 
the same period. They were all rents actually paid by 
us which 've should not have been required to pay, and 
the only reason for the segregation is that during the 
months we were in occupation part of our rent had to 
be paid on a :percentage basis, and when we were not 
in occupation, the percentage basis was not applicable 
because there were no sales upon which to base it. The 
base rental, however, went on even though we were not 
in occupation, and the same rule of law, also, allows 
recovery for the rent that we .actually and necessarily 
paid even though we were not in occupation of the 
premises~ We finally were released from the Snell lease 
on the old_ premises March 31, 1947, and we paid the 
rent for March, 1947, but we did not ask for that month's 
rent ·from the defendants. The rent that we paid for 
the month of March in the sum of $375.00 is just as re-
coverable as any of the other amounts, but since we 
did not ask for it, of course, we are making no clailn 
for it now. We do, however, respectfully insist that 
since the jury allowed us $2,400.00 for rent we actually 
paid while occupying the old premises and that amount 
is less than the amount we actually paid while we were 
in such occupancy, the court was wrong in reducing 
that sum from $2400.00 to $1125.00, and that the jury's 
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finding on item No. 4 that we should recover nothing 
for the i>ercentage rentals ""as clearly by reason of the 
fact that they had already allowed us $2,400.00 as re-
imbursement for the rent while we were actually in the 
store, as distinguished between the period covered by 
item No.3 of $1500.00 for the four months that we were 
not in possession. As stated, the jury found that we 
sustained total damages in the sum of $3900.00 for 
rental on the old store (items 2 and 3 of the verdict) 
which is well within the proof which shows that our 
actual damage 'vas $5,481.84. The same rule of damages 
applies to both items. Merely because the court segre-
gated them in the verdict should not dep~rive us of the 
amount of damage the jury found we actually sustained 
by having to pay rent on the old store by reason of the 
defendants' breach of its lease covenants. 
The rule with reference to damages goes back as 
far as Hadley vs. Baxendale, when the English Court, 
9 Ex. 341, in 1854 handed down an opinion which ever 
since has furnished the general standard by which 
English speaking courts all over the world have tested 
claims for damages for breach of contract. In that 
case the Court said: 
''Where two parties have made a contract 
which ·one of them has broken, the damages which 
the other party ought to receive in respect of 
such breach of contract should be such as may 
fairly and reasonably be considered either aris-
ing naturally, i.e., according to the usual course 
of things, from such breach of contract itself, or 
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such as may reasonably be supposed to have been 
in the contemplation of both parties, at the time 
they made the contract, as the probable result of 
the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances 
under which the contract was actually made were 
communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, 
and thus known to both parties, the damages re-
sulting from th·e breach of such a contract, which 
they would reasonably contemplate, would be the 
amount of injury which would ordinarily follow 
from a breach of contract under these special cir-
cumstances so known and communicated. But, on 
the othe_r hand, if these special circumstances 
were wholly unknown to the party breaking the 
contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed 
to have had in his contemplation the amount of 
injury which would arise generally and in the 
great multitude of cases not affected by any 
special circumstances, from such a breach of 
con tract. ' ' 
It is apparent from the rule that the consequences may 
have been foreseeable becau~e they would occur in the 
natural course of events or because, though unusual, 
the defendants knew of special facts making them prob-
able. The Restatement on Contracts, Section 330, states 
the rule as follows : 
"In awarding damages, compensation is given, 
for only those injuries that the defendant had 
reason to foresee as a probable result of his 
breach when the contract was made. If the in-
jury is one that follows the breach in the usual 
course of events, there is sufficient reason for 
the defendant to foresee it. Otherwise, it must 
he shown S'p~eci:fically that the defendant had 
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reason to know the facts and to foresee the in-
jury." 
We have already shown that Mr. Wolfe testified 
that before the lease was signed Mr. White was familiar 
with the terms of his lease on the Snell property; that 
it was on a flat base plus a percentage rental; that Ex-
hibit "W-W" is a continuation of the lease that Mr. 
Wolfe had at the time the lease in question was signed. 
The question then is: Is the injury, the payment of 
rent under the Snell lease, - one that "may fairly and 
reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., 
according to the usual course of thing.s, from such 
breach of contract· itself, or such as may reasonably be 
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both 
parties, at the time they made the contract, as the 
probably result of the breach of it'', or, under the lan-
guage of the Restatement, is ''the injury one that fol-
lows the breach in the usual course of events~" If it 
does, ''there is sufficient reason for the defendant to 
foresee it.'' The jury's verdict answers each question 
affirmatively. 
The defendants knew that plaintiffs would he re-
quired to pay rent on the Snell p~roperty, and certainly 
anyone would know that if the plaintiffs continued to 
occupy the Snell premises, they would have to pay rent 
for them. The plaintiffs could have been in their new 
premises by August 1, and by reason of the defendants' 
failure to fulfill the terms of~ their lease the defendants 
couldn't get into their new premises until November 7, 
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so certainly those damages which the jury assessed of 
$2,400.00 unquestionably followed the breach in the 
usual course of events. Did the injury, payment of ad-
ditional rental- for November, December, January and 
February, when the plaintiffs were not in possession of 
the old premises but when they had to pay rent under 
their lease and when they could have subleased had 
they been able to vacate in time, f?llow the breach in 
the usual course of events, or- may the injury fairly 
and reasonably be considered as arising naturally from 
the breach, or is the injury such as may reasonably 
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both 
parties at the time they made the contract, as the prob-
able result of the breach of it~ Should the defendant 
with the knowledge he had have reasonably expected 
that the plaintiffs would have to pay rent on the old 
premises even after they vacated~ Certainly anyone 
would know that when the plaintiffs couldn't occupy 
their new premises on time they would have to make 
arrangements with their old landlord to stay where 
they were, and certainly it naturally follows and is 
reasonably to be supposed that the old landlord would 
want some assurance of continuity and duration of the 
tenancy in order to allow the plaintiffs to continue in 
their possession of the old premises. ·The defendant 
James L. White himself conceded that he assumed that 
Mr. Wolfe would have ·to keep paying rent whatever 
was charged to him on the old premises, (T. 851), that 
if he couldn't get into the new place, he would have to 
pay rent there, that it was !POSsible to re-rent the old 
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pre1nises after you leaYe them, and that it 'vould lh~ 
yery difficult to secure a lease for a short tern1. '' 'Vhen 
you have only a short term, it is very difficult to get 
anyone to go into business. * · * * Nobody vvill go in 
business· on a year's lease." (T. 849, 850). Mr. White 
also admitted that he wouldn't give a lease on such 
property for a short term so certainly he could antici-
pate that ~lr. Wolfe could not continue to occupy his 
old premises without giving the Snell Estate a suitable 
lease, which according to Mr. White himself would have 
to- be longer than one year. Exhibit "W-W" indicates 
that the lease actually ran until December 31, 1947. Mr. 
Wolfe was able to terminate it March 31, 1947, nine 
months before its expiration date, and certainly the 
defendants should be required to pay for the months 
of November, December, January and February, the 
ren~al Mr. Wolfe had to pay when he could ha~e sub-
leased and avoided the payment had it not been for 
the breach of their lease by the defendants. 
The court instructed the jury, as we have already 
shown, that we could only recover this excess rent if 
the jury believed that such damage ''naturally and· 
directly flowed from such breach of the covenant by 
the defendants, and which the parties would reasonably 
have contemplated, if, at the time the lease was made, 
their attention had been called to the natural and direct 
consequences of such a breach of such covenant of the 
lease." (T. 154). This instruction of the court required 
the Jury, in order to allovv us for these items, to find 
more than is required under the authorities, as we have 
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shown. The court used the word ''and'' such as would 
have been in contemplation of the parties; whereas, the 
authorities use the word "or"; that is, the authorities, 
as we have shown, say that if the injury arises. in the 
natural course of events from the breach or is such as 
may be reasonably supposed to have been in the contem-
plation of the parties, there is a recovery. The court 
required the jury to find both circumstances to exist in 
order to return a verdict in our favor, and the jury 
did so find. The jury's verdict is right for the obligation 
to pay rent on property we were forced to lease in order 
to occupy it when we· should have been in our new 
ip·remises is an obligation that arises naturally and in 
the usual course of events from our inability to occupy 
our new p.remises due to the defendants' breach of the 
lease. 
The trial court was wrong in striking item No. 3, 
the $1500.00, for the months of November and December, 
1946, and January and February, 1947, in the face of 
the jury's verdict, and was also wrong in reducing 
item No. 2, the actual rental we paid while we were in 
· possession and which clearly the jury intended to allow 
us as damage for the payment of rent when we were in 
possession and which is less than the amount we ac-
tually did pay. 
The court had the alternative when the verdict was 
handed in of having the jury right then and there alter 
or rearrange the verdict, or of doing so himself, as to 
the $2400.00 item. If the court felt that the verdict was 
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not responsive to his instructions, the court should have 
directed the jury then and there to make the changes 
and alterations. The court had no right to substitute 
his judgment for that of the jury as to the amount of 
damage ""'e \Yere entitled to recover under the item of 
rent on the old premises during our actual occupancy 
of them. 53 Am. Jur., Sec. 1099, page 762, cites the 
rule which is so elementary as to require no citation, as 
follows: 
''The principle is general that when a .jury re-
turn an informal, insensible, or a repugnant 
verdict, or one that is not responsive to the issues 
submitted or is in disregar.d of the instructions 
of the court, they may be directed by the court 
to reconsider it and bring in .a ~·roper verdict, 
provided the verdict is returned before a judge 
present when the case was tried. This may be 
done with or without the consent of counsel and 
should be done whether requested or not. This 
principle has been applied to corrections by the 
jury as to damages, !parties, * * *, etc. The prac-
tice is really only an application of the settled 
rule that until the verdict has been recorded, or 
the jury have been discharged as unable to agree, 
their connection with the case has not come to an 
end." (Italics added.) ~. 
The court waited until three days .after the verdict had 
been received to ch!lnge it which he did June 6 on the 
margin of the judgment, (T. 166). 
If the court did not desire to have the jury rear-
range its verdict in accordance with the instructions, 
the court should have done so himself. We had asked 
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for damages for rental we paid out while in possession 
of the premises concerning which there could be no pos-
sible question as to such damages reasonably and 
naturally flowing from the breach. The court divided 
these damages into the base rental and the percentage 
rental, although they all come under the same category. 
When the jury found that we were entilted to $2,400.00 
for the rental we .actually paid while still in the posses-
sion of the old premises, if the court felt that the artifi-
cial segregation should still be made, he had the right 
to do that. This rule is also elementary. 53 Am. Jur., 
Section 1094, 1lage 758, says : 
''A verdict in a civil case which is defective 
or erroneous as to a mere matter of form not 
affecting the m~rits or rights of the parties may 
be amended by the court to conform it to the 
issues and to give effect to what the jury un-
mistakably found. In fact, it is the duty of the 
judge to look .after its form and substance, so 
as to prevent a doubtful or insufficient finding 
from passing into the records of the court, and 
ev-ery reaso11table construction should be adop.ted 
for the purpose of working the verdict into form 
so as to make it serv-e.'' (Italics added.) 
The defendants themselves led the court into the 
error on this matter of damages, particularly in striking 
item 3, the $1500.00 from the judgment. We called the 
court's attention to the fact that in our complaint and 
in our bill of particulars we had specifically asked for 
these damages and that we had raised that question in 
our briefs in this Court and that this Court had already 
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called attention to the fact that our complaint asked 
for reimbursement for these damages and that this 
Court had already said that our complaint stated a 
cause of action. The defendants, however, were able 
to lead the court into the error committed. They filed 
a memorandum brief in which they cited Globe Refining 
Comparvy vs. Landa Cotton Oil Company, 190 U.S. 540, 
47 L. Ed. 1171, and we called the Court's attention to 
the fact that despite this case, Hadley vs. Baxendale 
has been generally adopted except in some of the Federal 
cases. "\V"'"e called the Court's attention to the fact that 
Williston in his 1938 edition, Sections 1344, 1344 (a), 1356 
and 1357 points out that the acceptance of Hadley vs. 
Baxendale is well nigh universally followed by all of the 
courts. Williston points out that if the damages follow in . 
the natural course of events, they are presumed to be 
foreseeable. The jury found that all of these damages for 
rent followed in the natural course of events and also 
found that they were such as should reasonably have 
been in contemplation of the parties. 
McCormick in his Handbook on Damages (Horn-
book Series) says that the modern tendency is to liberal-
ize the application of Hadley vs. Baxendale: 
"Our rules should sanction, as our actual prac-
tice probably does, the award of consequential 
damages against one who deliberately and wan-
tonly breaks faith, regardless of the foresee-
ability of the loss when the contract was made. 
We shall then have completed the p-rocess, begun 
piecemeal in Hadley vs. Baxendale, of borrowing 
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from the French Civil Code its theory of damages 
in contract." (Sec .. 141, p. 581.) 
That the defendants deliberately, wantonly and inten-
tionally violated their contract in the case at bar is 
obvious. Williston, supra, cites the law the same as 
McCormick as above indicated. 
ATTORNEYS' FEES IN THIS COURT 
The jury awarded plaintiffs' attorneys $3,000.00 
for services up to and including. the termination of the 
trial, but no award was made, of course, for any further 
services on this appeal. The lease provides, paragraph 
17, 'P'age 129 of this Court's decision, for the payment 
of reasonable attorneys' fees. We call this to the Court's 
attention in order that this Court will have that question 
in mind when it -considers this case, and we respect-
fully request this Court to make an award of attorneys' 
fees for this appeal in such amount as the Court deems 
reasonable. In this connection may we say that we 
have been required by reason of this appeal and by 
reason of the method by which the defendants and ap-
pellants have presented their appeal, to read the entire 
transcript of the evidence, most of the pleadings, 
and all of the instructions of the court, and to make a 
rather complete index of the testimony. We have also, 
of course, been required to read the d_efendants' brief 
and cases cited and then re-examine their brief on the 
other appeal as well as our own brief in order to present 
this case in its true light to this Court, and we hav8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
65 
been compelled to write a complete statement of facts 
in our o-wn brief and answer the defendants' at consid-
erable length in order to p~esent to this Court the case 
as it actua~y exists. It also ap·pears to us that there is 
absolutely no basis for this appeal; that it is completely 
without merit, and it also appears to us that the defen-
dants' unfortunate influence on the trial court deprived 
us of $2775.00 awarded us by the jury, thus making it 
necessary _for us to present that matter to this Court. 
The actual time involved in the foregoing, including 
the work of revising, proof-reading and indexing the 
brief, aside from any oral argument to this Court, has 
consumed at least 21 days of actual time including Sat-
urdays full time, and for this ap·peal in view of all 
circumstances we feel that a reasonable fee to be allow-
ed us is $2500.00. 
THIS COURT SHOULD CORRECT VERDICT AND 
AWARD ATTO·RNEY'S FEES 
This Court should either correct the judgement and 
reinstate the verdict as it was rendered or should di-
rect the trial court to do so. The jury's verdict has been 
rendered. It is within the issues and sustained by the 
evidence. We definitely are not contending and are 
not asking for a reversal of this case. We do not desire 
a reversal. The verdict of the jury finding the issues 
in our favor 'Should stand and be affirmed as it was 
rendered. We wish to state very definitely that we do 
not assert that the error of the trial court with respect 
to altering the jury ''s verdict is reversible error and the 
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case should not he reversed for that reason. The verdict 
can be restored as it was rendered, and we respectfully 
request this Court either to do so or to direct the trial 
court to~ do so. There is no request for nor is there any 
nece~ssity for another trial because of this error. We, 
therefore, respectfully submit that the only error com-
mi ted in this case was the error of the trial court in al-
tering the jury's verdict and eliminating therefrom the 
damages awarded by the jury; that this should be cor-
rected and the judgement affirmed with this correction. 
We also respectfully request this Court to award the at-
torneys' fees as provided for in the lease. 
We come now to a 
REVIEW OF BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
AND DEFENDANTS 
The opening statement ·On page 1 of appellants' 
brief does not define the question involved in this case. 
Defendants' contention has already been rejected by 
this Court. Since ap;pellants' brief on this appeal is 
based and built upon this 'Statement, all that follows in 
the brief is likewise wrong and irrelevant in this case. 
The aforesaid opening statement is as follows: 
''The principal question presented in this 
case is whether an unqualified agreement hetween 
landlord and tenant that the latter, for a recited 
valuable consideration accepts the premises, in-
cluding an old building, 'in the condition and . 
state of re~pair they are now in,' is a valid 
covenant, enforceable between the contracting 
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parties: and 'Yhether a covenant to keep such 
condition imposes a duty to change it.'' 
There was no unqualified acceptance of these premises 
and there was no covenant merely to keep them as they 
were. 
This Court in its opinion, page 126, said: 
''The issue involved is this : Was .it the o bliga-
tion of the lessors, or the obligation of the 
lessees, under the terms of the following written 
lease, to remedy a condition of the roof of the 
leased premises characterized by the Salt Lake 
City building authorities .as urisafe.'' 
The Court then quotes the letters of the building author-
ities with reference to the roof ·declaring it to be unsafe 
and requiring it to be made safe, and then quotes the 
lease in full. Paragraphs 6 and 8 of the "lease we have 
already quoted. 
Appellants in their present brief continue to ignore 
as they did in their former brief, and as they have from 
the beginning of this controversy, the express language 
of paragraph 8, and continue to discuss the said para-
graph as though it only required them to keep the roof 
in repair. They ignore their obligation to keep the roof 
in good condition. For 15 months after the accep~tance 
of the premises by us, which was only upon the limita-
tions provided for in paragraph 8, the defendants had 
the duty to keep the roof in good condition and repair. 
We accepted the premises only upon this covenant on the 
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part of the defendants, which was also a representation 
to us that at the time of our acceptance the roof was in 
good condition and repair. There was no unqualified ac-
ceptance by us of the roof, nor is there involved in this 
case any implied covenant upon which we base our rights 
against the defendants. If at the time we were to take 
possession, some 15 months after the execution of the 
lease, the roof was not in good condition, then the de .. 
fendants had· not fulfilled or complied with the express 
covenant of the lease, and if the roof was then in bad 
condition, it was the defendants' duty to place it or put 
it in good condition. These matters were all.presented 
to and decided by this Court. This Court, page 130, said: 
''Let us consider the present lease. Para-
graph 6 says that the Lessees 'accept said 
premises in the condition and state of repair 
they are now in.' According to the briefs of the 
parties the lower court seemed to lay consider-
able stress upon this provision. But what about 
paragraph 8 which provides that 'For the entire 
term of this lease the Lessors shall have the 
obligation to keep the roof of the leased premises 
in good condition and repair * * *.' If it may be 
prop~erly inferred from the first quotation-the 
one from paragraph 6-that the Lessors would 
not be responsible for a roof in bad condition at 
the time of the execution of the lease then we 
have .a situation wherein the inferences of that 
quotation are in conflict with those of the dec-
laration of the second quotation-from para-
graph 8-as the Lessors were, during the entire 
term of the lease and under the second quota-
tion, to keep the roof in good condition, which 
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implies that at the time of the lease it was, in 
good condition, otherzuise the Lessors u;o.uld not 
have agreed to keep it in that condition. (Italics 
added.) The obligation to keep the roof in good 
condition and repair for the entire term of the 
lease eliminates the thought that the Lessees 
would have to put the roof in good condition 
before that obligation fell on the shoulders of 
the Lessors.'' 
This Court then points out, :page 131, that our obligation 
to make improvements other than the store front did 
not ae.,crue until May 31, 1946; that the condition of the 
roof complained of developed prior to that time, . 
''and the obligation of correcting it arose 1prior 
to that time. * * * The law we have cited above 
places the burden as to requirements by building 
authorities under such circumstances on the 
shoulders of the Lessor. The law in this case, we 
think, is strengthened by the terms of paragraph 
8 speci:fiedly placing responsibility for the roof 
on the shoulders of the Lessor. 
''Th-e suggestion of the Lessors that only 
ordinary repairs were contempl~ted by para-
graph 8-that structural changes were not con-
templated, would be stronger if the word 'repair' 
was the only word used in paragraph 8 as de-
scriptive of the Lessors' duties. 'Good condi-
tion' we discussed above. Even the word 'repair' 
however has a relative meaning. There is implicit 
in the maintenance of any part of a building the 
pur.pose for which that part is intended to func-
tion. * * * A faulty construction or remodeling 
of the roof may lead to quicker wearing out, but 
it doesn't change the meaning of 'repair'.'' 
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This Court on page 130 called attention to the fact 
that we allege that we could not get the defendants to 
remedy the 'Situation and therefore did the work our-
selves and asked for reimbursement for our expendi-
tures, damages and attorneys' fees. There is thus impli-
cit in the ruling of this Court reversir~g the lower court 
at the former hearing the recognized rule that if defen-
dants failed to perform their duty, we had the right to do 
so and recover our expenditures for so doing. The de-
fendants in the present appeal have neither p.resented 
nor argued the question of damages nor the question of 
. our right to do what we did. Their present appeal .is 
based solely, as was their former one, upon the prop-
osition that they had no obligation to do anything with 
reference to the roof. They do not claim as, -of course, 
they cannot, that they even undertook to make "repairs" 
to the roof. Their position is the same now as it has 
always been - that they had no obligation or duty. 
They also infer that the roof was safe regardless of the 
facts and the requirements of the public authorities. 
They make no pretense that they did anything with ref-
erence to the roof after the matter was called to their 
attention by the public authorities, our architect, and 
by us. Their whole argument continues to be that they 
had no duty and so they did nothing. Since this Court 
has already determined that they did have a duty to act, 
and the evidence, conclusively establishes that they did 
nothing, they have raised no relevant points on this 
appeal. 
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It is true that in the p.resent appeal the defendants 
and appelants devote some 6 pages to what they call 
their point III, ''Appellants' right to support the roof 
should have been submitted". This argument is a pure 
afterthought and subterfuge since appellants never at 
any time attempted to exercise their so-called ''right to 
support the roof.'' 
It thus ap.pearing that defendants "Statement" of 
the question involved, on page 1 of their brief, is not 
the issue here, as has already been decided by this Court, 
we shall proceed as expeditiously as possible to review 
the remainder of their brief which really is nothing more 
than a second petition for re-hearing of the former case. 
DEFENDANT'S "HISTORY OF LITIGATION" 
Under this heading defendants argue that in our 
amended complaint we set forth that the roof conditions 
became worse after the lease was entered into. At 
other ;places in their brief they argue that our case was 
based upon a change in the condition of the roof after 
the lease was entered into, and that there is no· evidence 
of a change, and consequently we cannot recover, pages 
4, et. seq. The quotation they themselves give frorn 
our complaint on page 4 of their brief shows that we 
alleged ''that plaintiffs do not know when the s~aid roof 
first became dangerous and un·safe but the said unsafe 
condition became progressively worse from the date of 
said lease.'' One of the defendants himself as late as 
October 9, 1945, eight months after the lease was entered 
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into, advised us that he had had the roof fixed and "that 
the roof is now in excellent shape," Exhibit "H." The de-
fendants also offered evidence by 0. C. Nielson, (T. 781) 
. that in 1937 a new -covering was put on the roof, and by 
B. T. Cannon, a roofing contractor, ( T. 785 ), that in 
October, 1945, he went over the roof and examined it 
and that it was in good condition. If this letter of the 
defendant and the evidence of Mr. Cannon are true, 
then, of course, it follows that the condition found by 
the public authorities of Salt Lake City and the plain-
tiffs' architect and contractor occurred after October, 
1945, which was eight months after the lease was entered 
into. As a matter of fact, neither the plaintiff nor the 
defendant made any -examination of the roof, neither 
one of them thought that the city would declare the roof 
to be unsafe, and neither one of them knew anything 
about the roof at the time the lease was entered into, 
( T. 859). We have already sufficiently· discussed this 
matter heretofore in our brief and will not repeat here. 
Defendants 'attempt to avoid the effect of the opin-
ion of thi'S Court concerning the duty of GOmplying with 
the requirements of public au~horities, ·and on ~,age n, 
say: 
''These op1n1ons of the City .authorities, 
while they were used throughout the trial to 
greatly influence the jury, were finally removed 
from the case, as a basis of duty or liability, by 
an instruction of the court ( 149), and are no 
longer of importance as constituting any basis 
of right or duty." 
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In other 'vords, defendants assert that the trial court 
overuled this Court so what this Court said in its opin-
ion is of no pre~ent importance. It is true the trial 
court did give an instruction that "The responsibility 
of the defendants to the plaintiffs is not to be deter-
mined by any act or finding of the building inspector. 
The defendants' only obligation was, as provided in 
the lease, to keep the roof of said building in good con-
dition and repair, as defined in these instructions", (T. 
149). We excepted to this instruction because we be-
lieved and still believe, as this Court held in its opin-
ion, that the defendants did have a duty to satisfy the 
public authorities with reference to this roof. The 
opinions of the city authorities are still very much in 
this case. Be that as it may, it is difficult to see how 
the defendants are aided by an erroneous instruction 
that was favorable to them. In the same instruction 
the trial court did, however, say that the defendants' 
obligation was to be determined by the terms of the 
lease, and in the next instruction, ( T. 150), told th~ 
jury that we were not required to accep.t or adopt plans 
or proposals with reference to the roof that were not 
acceptable to Salt Lake City building authorities, and 
plaintiffs were not required to enter into any contro-
versy or dispute with the Salt Lake City building 
authorities with respect to the repair to the roof. This 
correctly states the law, and if we may digress a mo-
ment, it also reflects the hick of merit in defendants' 
point III. 
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Not only did defendants make no effort to fix the 
roof, but their representatives, Miles Miller and Young 
& Hansen, insisted that the public authorities were 
wrong and that the roof was all right; that even if it 
wasn't all right it could be fixed for about $800.00 by a 
method which was rejected by the public authorities, 
Exhibits 1, "P" and "Q". The defendants never made 
any applicat·ion to the public authorities for a permit 
to fix the roof, and the only suggestion that they ever 
made was the letter of Young & Hansen that there was 
nothing wrong with the roof, but that it could be 
strengthened by extending the trusses through the sky-
lights at an expense of $800.00. This letter of Young & 
Hansen was never submitted to plaintiffs until July 8, 
1946, more than ·a month after plaintiffs should . have 
been in the premises, and the ~proposal was not accepted 
by the building ins;pector, Exhibit "Q". The court did, 
however, tell the jury that before we could recover we 
had to prove that the roof was not in good condition 
and repair; that the defendants had notice thereof and 
failed for a reasonable time to place the roof in good 
condition ·and repair, ( T. 146). 
- The defendants do not specifically object to any 
of the instructions of the court in their ''Errors Relied 
Upon'', pages 27 and 28. The objection they make is 
that they were not liable at all and consequently the 
court should have directed a verdict, and that the form 
of verdict was erroneous as it invited the assessment 
of damages ·against the defendants, although the court 
specifically told the jury, (T. 157), that the jury was 
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to disregard any instruction 'vith reference to damages 
unless they felt that the plaintiff should recover. 
Returning now to their brief after these digressions. 
The trial court instead of allowing us to rely upon the 
requirements of the public authorities, required us also 
to establish to the satisfaction of the jury tha.t the roof 
in fact "\Vas not in good condition and repair when "\Ve 
were to assume our tenancy, June 7, 1946. The trial 
court· could not and did not remove from the case the 
requirements of the public authorities of Salt Lake 
City, and even though the instruction was more favor-
able to the defendants than they wer~ entitled . to, the 
requirements of the public authorities ar~ not only still 
in the case ~ut are relevant ap.d moving factors that 
made i~ obligatory f.or the defendants to take some 
action with reference to the roof or else respond j n 
damages for the losses we sustained by reason of their 
dereliction. 
The defendants assume that this Court based its 
opinion upon our allegation ·of "change in. conditions 
after the lease was entere·d into''. There is not now 
and never was any relevancy as to when the roof be-
came in bad condition. If at any time during ''the entire 
term of the lease'' the roof was not in good condition 
and rep.air, it was the duty of the defendants to fix it. 
At thi'S point may we remark that we are unable to 
follow the defendants in their attem;pt to make a dis-
tinction between keeping the roof in good condition and 
repair and putting the roof or placing the roof in good 
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condition and repair. If at any time during the lease 
the roof was not in good condition and repair, the only 
way that defect could be remedied would be to put it 
in good condition or place it in good condition. If the 
thing becomes out of condition or out of repair and is 
kept that way, it is not kept in good condition and re-
pair, and it, therefore, can only be kept in good condi-
tion and repair if it is then placed or put in good con-
dition and rep.air. The truth of the matter is, defend-
ants are still insisting that they had no obligation with 
reference to the roof; that because we accepted the 
:premises in the condition they were in, it was not their 
obligation to comply with ihe requirement's of the public 
authorities. This is not only contrary to the general 
law, the opinion of this court, but also contrary to the 
express terms of the lease. We had no duty with refer-
ence to the p·remises until the last ten years of the lease, 
which period did not commence until May 31, 1946, at 
the earliest. The bad condition complained of wa'S in 
existence long before this and was present during the 
period when the defendants had agreed that the roof 
would be kept in good condition and repair. They didn't 
keep it in good condition and repair, and consequently 
the only way that it could be rectified was to put it in 
good condition. We are sorry we have to reiterate 
these matters, but the defendants' entire brief is so 
replete and honeycombed with their fallacies and re-
jected theories that we encounter them on nearly every 
page. 
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On page 6 defendants assert that the trial went 
upon the theory that all that ''"'as before the jury in 
this case "~as the question of dam·ages. This statement 
is pure fiction. The defendants themselves have already 
~hown, arg·ued and ;pointed out that the trial court took 
out of the case our right to rely upon the public authori-
ties and we were required to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the roof in fact was not in good 
condition and repair prior to June 7, 1946. 
DEFENDANTS' ''STATEMENT OF FACTS'' 
Under their statement of facts defendants them-
selves call attention to the fact that defendant James 
White and their witness, B. T. Cannon, in October, 1945, 
asserted that the roof was in good condition. They also 
in their ·statement of facts call attention to correspond-
ence, disclosed by the exhibits we have heretofore spe-
cifically discussed, between· Mr. Wolfe and Mr. White, 
the public authorities, plaintiffs' architect, Mr. Paul-
son, all showing that as early _as January, 1946, the de-
fendants knew that the building authorities of Salt 
Lake City insisted that the roof was uns·afe and that it 
must be fixed -or that occupancy later than the summer 
of 1946 would be denied, and that the defendant James 
White insisted .that it was not his obligation and that he 
did nothing. The defendants attempt to give the im-
pression that because the plaintiff Mr. Wolfe was trying 
to make these premises ''the 'show place of the West'', 
he had determined to remove the interior posts so as 
to make a clear span roof at the ex;pense of the defend-
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ants. Actually, the Exhibits 2, 6, 7, "B" to "M" inclu-
sive, show that for months Mr. Wolfe was trying to get 
Mr. White to fix the roof any way that would make it 
safe; that Mr. White not only refused but denied his 
obligation to do so. vVhen the clear span roof was put 
on, the cost of a clear span roof in excess of a roof 
which would use the interior posts, was eliminated frorn 
the cost of the roof, Exhibit "D "-1, and a roof was 
constructed in the cheapest and most economical way 
that could be done. The defendants say on page lS 
that Mr. White told 1\tir. Paulson (plaintiffs' architect) 
''to go ahead on this proposal'', that is the proposal 
to truss in the skylights. _ Not only does Mr. Paulson 
deny this, but it is clearly shown by Exhibit ·''Q'', Mr. 
Nelson, Mr. Gerald Cannon and Mr. Paulson, that this 
method of fixing the roof would not correct the unsafe 
condition of the roof nor- would it meet the approval of 
the building inspector. Appellants' statement of facts, 
page 23, says that Mr. Paulson drew a blue p.rint, Ex-
hibit '' P '', which did not support the plan of their 
architects, Young & Hansen, because "it did not show 
the joi·sts running through the skylight from girder to 
wall" as Young & Hansen suggested. The blue print in 
both Exhibit ''P'' and Exhibit 1 in plain and unequivo-
cal language states : ''Frame through present skylights 
with same spacing and same trusses as adjoining''. The 
Young & Hansen letter, Exhibit 1 and Exhibit "P", 
says: "If the skylights are to be eliminated, we sug-
gest the same designed trusses and rafters used 
throughout be placed thru these openings.'' That is 
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exactly 'vhat Mr. Paulson did in his diagram, and the 
building inspector 'vouldn 't accept it. Defendants say 
on page 24, that naturally the building inspector would 
not accept the plan based on the proposals of Young & 
Hansen, and that "~e didn't advise Mr. White that the 
application had been made or questioned. The building 
inspector testified that he told Mr. White the plans 
were not acceptable, and Mr. White in Exhibit ''VV" 
says, himself, that on July 11, he knew about the appli-
cations, and that on that day the Building Inspector 
read him Exhibit '' Q' ', the letter of refusal. While 
appellants complain that we did nothing, the question 
naturally arises, why did they not do something~ It 
was their duty, not ours. The letter from their archi-
tects was not even submitted to us until a month after 
we should have been in, although Mr. White had known 
for more than six months what was required to be ·done. 
Appellants make it clear on p·age 25 that all of this talk 
that precedes that page is mere camouflage .. They make 
this statement: "It was Mr. White's contention that 
he was not required, by the lease, to make or pay for 
the changes, alterations, and new construction to re-
place the existing roof.'' 
DEFENDANTS' ''ERRORS RELIED UPON'' AND 
"POINTS DISCUSSED", PARTICULARLY 
POINT III. 
Defendants clearly indicate that regardless of 
what this Court has said, that because we accepted the 
premises they had no further duty, and that to keep 
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in repair does not mean to put in repair. These points 
have already been decided by this Court ·and sufficiently 
discussed by our brief herein. They add a point III, 
that since the roof did not change or get out of repair, 
the only duty of the defendants could be in any event 
to supp·ort it as it was, and the jury should have been 
so instructed and this theory submitted. We confess 
we do not know what it means to support the roof as 
it was. They made no effort to do •anything. 
They complain, pag,e 63, that the court did not give 
their instructions No. 13, (T. 130) and 18, {T. 135). 
With reference to instruction No. 13, (T. 130), th~ 
court did instruct the jury, as we have heretofore indi-
lthe roof was not in good condition and repair; that the 
"cated, that before we could recover we had to show that 
, defendants had notice thereof and a reasonable oppor-
tunity to place the same in a state of good condition 
and repair, and that they failed and refused to do so. 
By their verdict ·the jury found all these things~ De-
fendants' requested instru_ction attempted to invade the 
p~rovince of the jury by stating that in no event would 
they be li·able for the expense of cons·tructing a new roof. 
Defendant'S' requested instruction No. 13 is contrary 
to the decision of this Court. It was not the measure 
of the defendants' liability merely to keep the old roof 
in the condition and state of repair it was in when the 
premises were accepted by the plaintiffs. Defendants~ 
requested instruction No. 18, (T. 135), the court did 
give in substance in its .instruction No. 4, (T. 144), and 
No. 9, (T. 149). The court had already vointed out in 
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instruction No. 4 ''The burden of proof is also upon the 
plaintiff to prove by ·a preponderance of the evidence 
the costs and expenses reasonably incurred in putting 
the said roof in good condition and repair." We could 
not recover, the court says, unless the roof ·structure 
was unsafe, and responsibility of the defendants was 
not to be determined by any act or finding of the build-
ing inspector. The defendants' discussion under point 
ill argues that the inadequate drain could have been 
met by the exp.enditure of $485.56, (they were only 
charged $55.72, Ex. "BB"), the tru'Ssing of the sky-
lights $800.00, and by nailing of loose joints for not to 
exceed $500.00. If the jury had believed that the ex-
penditure of these items were all that was required to 
put the roof in good condition and repair, they under 
the instructions of the court would have found only in 
that amount. The defendants do not point to any other 
instructions except the two we have referred to-one 
of which is wrong, 'and the other of ~hich was embodied, 
some of it erroneously, in the instructions the court did 
give the jury. The jury had before it all of their testi-
mony with reference to the amounts they claimed 
would have fixed the roof which the jury did not believe 
as is apparent from its verdict. Under this point III 
the defendants object to the form of verdict, ( T. 165), 
at page 65 of their brief. The court had already in-
structed the jury with reference to the question of 
damages, (T; 154), and by t}:le form of the verdict the 
jury were given the right and option to find, if they so 
desired, that the amounts contended for by the defend-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
82 
ant'S at pages 64 and 65 of their brief were adequate 
to fix the roof, but obviously the jury didn't believe the 
defendants' witnesses on these points, nor is that diffi-
cult to understand when the testimony of those wit-
nesses is considered, as we have already -pointed out. 
With respect to sub-divisions 2, 3 and 4 of the verdict 
the court expressly instructed the jury that they could 
only find damages that naturally and directly flowed 
from the breach and which reasonably would have been 
in contemplation of the parties at the time the lease 
wa'S entered into if their attention had been called to 
such a breach, (T. 154). It does not follow that had 
the jury b~lieved that the roof could be fixed for the 
amounts contended by, the defendants the jury would 
not have made a finding in favor of the plaintiffs on 2, 
3_ and 4 of the verdict. The· evidence would amply have 
supported the verdict on these items even had the jury 
fixed the cost of repairing the roof at $1785.56, the 
figures set forth by the defendants. There never was 
any offer or attempt on the part of the defendants to 
fix the roof at all let alone expend $1785.56 for that 
pur;pose. Even could the roof have been fixed for that 
amount, which it could not, and the jury obviously so 
~found, defendants never at any time offered to do so, 
and consequently the jury were entitled to find for the 
plaintiffs on sub-divisions 2, 3 and 4 of the verdict re-
gardless of the amount of money it took to fix the roof. 
Under their point III defendants contend at page 66 
that several instructions negative their theory. The 
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instructions complained of, (T. 140), n1erely stated the 
contentions of the plaintiffs and the defendants includ-
ing the defendants' contention that the roof could be 
fixed not for $1785.56 but for $800.00, and ( T. 145, 146, 
147, 152, 153, 154), state the la'v as announced by this 
Court on the former appeal. 
Defendants presented fully to the jury their clain1 
that the roof could be fixed for $1785.56, and the court 
instructed the jury that in the. event they determined 
we were entitled to recover we could only recover for 
work which was reasonably necessary to put. the roof 
in good condition, (T. 148), and that we were required 
to use the most efficient and· economical means possible 
and practicable under the circumstances, and that the 
defendants were under no liability to pay anything 
more than the actual and necessary costs of so plaeing 
the roof in good condition and repair, (T. 151), and we 
.could also only recover such damages as directly and 
naturally flowed from the breach and would reasonably 
have been in contemplation of the parties at the time 
the lease was made if their attention had been called 
to such consequences as 'a result of the breach, ( T. 154). 
The defendants asked the court to instruct the jury on 
theories in conflict with the decision of this Court. The 
court did instruct the jury fully, adequately and cor-
rectly, and in fact by instruction No. 9, (T. 149), and 
14 (T. 154), gave the defendants more favorable in-
structions than they were entitled to. 
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POINTS I AND II OF DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
Defendants' argument on points I and II, pages 29 
to 63 of their brief, is only a reargument of the posi-
tion they heretofore took in this Court 'and which this 
Court rejected. The argument at page 29 of their 
present brief that ''a covenant of acceptance of the 
existing condition is binding'' we have sufficiently dis-
cussed. That statement does not state the question in-
volved in this case at all. Defendants do, however, point 
out that the plaintiffs spent $55,000.00 on their build-
ing, page 30, which when added to the rental provided 
for in the lease would, if made in monthly payments, 
make .the defendants' rental for the last ten years of 
the lease some $1058.00 every month. Defendants say 
that it is common knowledge that their tax bill will go 
up annually $3,000.00 because of the improvements we 
made. Defendants required, paragraph 3 of the lease, 
that· we sp.end at least $10,000.00 and such additional 
amount as was nece'Ssary to make permanent improve-
ments including the installment of a first-class store 
front. They contemplated and required us to spend 
money on their v~roperty. So we do not see the pertin-
ency of their statement that their t•ax bill was increased 
$3,000.00 annually, even though there is no evidence to 
support "Such an assertion. They state that ''such a 
choice should not have been forced upon them, in any 
part, by judicial legislation.'' Nothing was forced upon 
the defendants except the compliance with the lease 
which they wrote. 
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That defendants h·a.ve merely copied their former 
brief on the former appeal is apparent. While they 
have cited additional cases in this brief ·and have left 
out others which they heretofore cited and which were 
demonstrably inapplicable, their argument is the same, 
and, in fact, in m·any instances their \Vording is iden-
tical. For instance, in the present brief ( P. 59) they 
again cite Cadnzan vs. Hy-Grade Food Products CoT-
poration, 33 N.E. (2) 759. Not only is the citation 
wrong, as we pointed out in our former brief, 'but the 
name of the case is wrong. The case is Godman V'S. By-
Grade Food Pro-ducts Corporation and it is found in 
3 N.E. (2) 759. They haven't even taken the trouble 
to correct their former erroneous citation. That case 
holds in line with the decision of this Court on the 
former a.ppeal that ''there is implicit in the mainten-
ance of any part of the building the purpose for which 
that part is intended to function",-page 131. The Court 
in the. Codman case also says: 
''The phrases 'in good tenable repair' and in 
'good condition' appearing in such lease do not 
have a fixed or technical meaning which Is 
always the same regardless of the· character or 
use of the building to which they refer." 
That Court also s'aid it should be taken into considera-
tion "the use to which the building is to be put and the 
character of business there to be carried on.'' When 
we consider that in the case at bar the :plain tiffs were 
required by the defendants to expend a large amount 
of money to put in a first-class store front; that the 
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lease · expressly provides that the premises are to be 
used for a mercantile business, and that the defendants 
in keeping with that character of expenditure and that 
character of business would for the entire term keep 
the roof in good condition and repair, we have no dif-
ficulty in concluding as this Court has alre~ady con-
cluded that the condition complained about by the 
~public author.ities and which actually existed was a con-
dition that the defendants under the lease were required 
to rectify. 
As further evidence that the defendants ~are merely 
repeating their former arguments it is interesting to 
note that the reference to the ·Godman case, supra, and 
the discu'Ssion of that case contained at pages 59 and 
60, including the first paragraph of -page 61, are copied 
word for word from the defendants' former brief in 
this case on pages 14, 15 and 16. 
Turning to the index of cases in defendants' brief 
herein we find that the case of Dwight vs. Ludlow Mfg. 
Co., 128 Mass. 280, is cited at page 41 of their present 
brief in the identical language used by them at page 21 
of their former brief. This case, as we heretofore 
pointed out at page 23 of our reply brief, is actually 
an ·authority in our favor. Accord~g to Mr. Miller, de-
fendants' witness arid the architect who constructed the 
roof as it existed at the time the lease was entered into, 
that original roof met the requirements of the public 
authorities at the time it was constructed, (T. 628), 
and that is ·all we are asking that the roof do now is to 
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n1eet the requirements of the public authorities in 1946. 
Mr. Miller conceded that the 1922 construction does not 
comply with the present ordinance, (T. 719). The roof 
passed the building inspector in 1922 according to Mr. 
Miller, but when we went into possession it was in a 
position \Yhere it was not acceptable under the Code. 
When it reached that condition no one kno\vs. Obviously, 
from the nature of the construction the roof didn't get 
any better as time progressed. The defendant James 
White and his roofer, Mr. B. T. Cannon, stated the roof 
was in. good condition in October, 1945. It was not in 
good condition in January of 1946. Its original con-
struction was faulty to begin with. From the very 
nature of physical properties it was bound to become 
worse with time. No one knows what condition the roof 
was in at the time the lease was entered into in Febru-
ary, 1945. The defendant himself concedes that neither 
he nor Mr. Wolfe made 'any examination of it, (T. 859). 
The next case duplicated by the defendants is 
Kingstead vs. Wright County, 133 N.W. 399, cite9. by 
them at page 38 of the present brief, page 13 of their 
original brief, and replied to by us at page 16 in our 
reply brief, where we pointed out that the covenants 
in the two cases were entirely dissimilar. Under para-
graph 6 -of our lease the exception required the lessors 
to do the s'ame thing with reference to the exce~pted 
prop.erty as we were required to do with that not ex-
cepted, and under paragraph 8 the lessors' duty was 
even greater. 
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The next duplication is St. J osep~h & 8t.- Louis Rail;. 
road Co. vs. St. Louis, Iron Mountain Southern Railway 
Go., 3'6 S.W. 602, cited at page 57 of d~fendants' present 
brief and relied upon by them at page 9 of their former 
brief ·and replied to by us at page 9 of .our reply brief. 
In that case plaintiff leased its railroad to Wabash. 
Wabash agreed to put the road in such condition that 
it could be operated efficiently. Wabash did not do 
this and sublet to defendant who only agreed to deliver 
up the •p.rop.erty in the same good order -and repair as 
it was at the time of subletting. Plaintiff tried to hold 
the defendant for the breach committed by Wabash. 
The Court said the sublessee was not liable- for the 
p·rior breach. The referee, however, to whom the case 
was referred in the beginning stated that if Wabash 
had been the defendant he would have found for the 
plaintiff. Applying the rule of that case to the case at 
bar, the defendants agreed that_ for 15 months before 
we went into possession they would keep the roof in 
good condition. We accepted the premises in reliance 
upon this promise. They did not do so. The lease was 
breached before we went into -possession. 
Defendants also cite 'Walker vs. Cosgrove, 273 S.W. 
450, at page 39 of their present brief, copied in the 
exact language of page 20 of their former brief, replied 
to by us at ~page 23 of our reply brief, wherein we 
pointed out that in that case the tenant agreed to take 
good care of the property and pay for ordinary repairs. 
Actually, the case involved the attempt of the landlord 
to raise the tenants rent, and the court recognized that 
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the repair feature was injected by the landlord simply 
as a subterfuge to compel the tenant either to pay in-
creased rent or get out. The drain was in poor condi-
tion when the tenant took possession, and the case holds 
that his obligation was to make repairs that· resulted 
from his use. The obligation in the case at bar was that 
of the landlord. He obligated himself to keep the roof 
in good condition during the 15 months we were not in 
possession after the lease was entered in to. This he 
did not do. 
Picking out at randoni other of the authorities 
cited by defendants, their inapplicability is ~eadily Rtp-
parent. For instance, on page 38 they cite Underhill; 
Landlord & Tenant, page 782, holding that there is no 
implied warranty on the pa.rt of the landlord. We are 
not dealing in this case with any implied warranties or 
any implied covenants. We are ·dealing with an express 
covenant. Again take the case of O'Malley vs ... Twenty-
Five Associates, (Brief P. 40), 60 N.E. 387, opinion by 
Justice Holmes. In that case Justice Holmes says, 
page 388: 
''No doubt when the lessor retains control he 
owes a duty, and, in some cases where the point 
which we now are considering was not before 
the mind of the court, the duty has been spoken 
of in a general w.ay as a duty to keep the article 
or place reasonably safe.'' 
The trial court in the case at bar defined the defendants' 
duty under the lease as a duty to keep the roof in such 
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condition and repair that the roof would be reasonably 
safe and adequate for its normal usage and purposes, 
(T. 143). Mr. Justice Holmes' language is particularly 
ap1p.licable in connection with this instruction. Justice 
Holmes continues on page 388: 
''But when attention has been directed in any 
way to the condition of things at the beginning 
of the lease, it has been recognized as the general 
rule that the tenant must take things as he finds 
them, and if they then are unsafe, cannot com-
plain. There is no implied undertaking or duty 
on the landlord's part to make things better than 
they are.'' 
As the record indicates, neither party to the lease knew 
of the condition of the roof at the beginning of the lease, 
and the plaintiffs accepted the premises only upon de-
fendants' promise to keep the roof, with which neither 
of them was familiar, at all times in good condition. We 
are not·· dealing, as we have stated, with any implied 
undertaking or duty on the part of the landlord. 
The case of Robinson vs. Wilson, 173 P. ·331, cited 
by defendants at page 34. of their present brief, was 
cited by them extensively in their former brief at pages 
16 and 47, and discussed in principle by us at page 18 
of our reply brief. The court eX!pressly said in that 
case that if the lessee desires to protect himself, he 
must exact of the lessor an express stipulation (which 
lessee did in the case at bar), and that in the absence 
of special stipulation (which is ~p.resent here), the lessor 
is not liable. 
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·Under defendants points I and II they argue, to 
sunllllarize it briefly, that because \Ye accepted the 
premises in the condition they \vere in in February, 
1945, they had no duty to make the roof safe, although 
when the time came for us to occupy the premises 15 
months later, the roof 'vas unsafe. They also argue 
that the covenant to keep in repair does not mean to 
put in repair. They consistently throughout the entire 
brief ignore the fact that they did more than agree to 
keep in repair. They agreed to keep in good condition 
and repair. This Court has already called attention to 
the fact that repair is not the only word used ·as descrip~ 
tive of lessors' duties; that in addition, the words ''good 
condition" were used. This Court said, however, that 
even the word "repair" has a relative meaning. "There 
is im1>licit in the maintenance of any part of the build-
ing the purpose for which that part is intended to func-
tion.'' On page 54 of their brief they attempt to elimi-
nate the words ''good condition" with the bald state-
ment: "condition or repair means the same thing". If 
so, why did defendant ·use both words~ It is a common 
rule of construction that all words and phrases are 
used deliberately and must all be given meaning and 
effect. It is thus apparent that as we have heretofore 
stated defendants' present brief is the same as their 
former brief, advances the same arguments, sometimes 
in different language, other times in the identical lan-
guage heretofore 1p.resented to this Court. Their cases 
are no different and are of no more applicability now 
than they were then. As we have shown, most of them 
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concern implied covenants with which we are not con-
cerned in this case, ~apply only to repairs, although as 
this Court has pointed out, even the word "repair" 
has a ·relative meaning. 
The defendants suggest that this Court didn't 
know what it was doing in coming to its decision herein, 
or that if it did know what it was doing it was \Vrong. 
On page 43 of their present brief they say: 
''Incidentally, we believe, if the Court cares 
to examine the authorities cited by it (p. 130, 
par. 1), under what is stated to be a 'general 
rule' as to requirements affecting landlords, it 
will be found that these apply only", etc. 
This, we take it, assumes that the Court has not ex-
amined the authorities and consequently does not know 
what they hold. Of course, we believe the Court did 
know what it was doing since it cited correctly the gen-
eral rule. The general rule could not be .otherwise. Cer-
tainly, where the public authorities say that property 
under their jurisdiction is unsafe they may require the 
owner of the property to fix it. However, in the case 
at bar we h~ave not only the requirement of the public 
authorities, but the express provisions of the lease 
'Placing upon the defendants the duty they refused to 
assume. On page 42 of their brief defendants again 
assume that this Court didn't know what it was doing. 
They say: 
"We think that the assumption by respond-
ents and the Trial Court that this Court, on first 
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appeal, committed itself to this erroneous doc-
trine is not justified by what was said in the 
opinion. Such commitment would be contrary to 
previous decisions of this Court, cited _herein, as 
well as to the settled law in other jurisdictions. '' 
The erroneous doctrine referred to is that announced 
by this Court that we did not by accepting the premises 
in February, 1945, agree that 15 months later the de-
fendants would not be required to fix a roof which was 
then unsafe and which they had agreed in the interim 
to keep in good condition. We believe this Court knew 
exactly what it was_ doing and that it announced correct 
principles of law and that the defendants' present at-
tempt to rehash and reargue its former errors should 
be futile. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a useless and needless appeal. There is no 
sense to it, and there has been nothing added by the 
present brief that was not fully discussed and decided 
on the former appeal. We do not believe that the de-
fendants' points or authorities justify a rehearing of· 
this case by this Court. Their petition for :a rehearing 
was denied long ago. The lower court committed no 
error of which the defendants can complain ; they have 
had a full and fair trial, and the evidence amply demon-
strates that the allegations of our complaint were over-
whelmingly sustained. The defendants have no defense 
in this case, and the jury's verdict was amvly justified. 
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However, we do believe that the trial court com-
mitted error heretofore specified by us in eliminating 
from the verdict the certain items of damage heretofore 
discussed after the jury had awarded them to us. We 
have stated the reasons why we believe this Court should 
correct the judgment or direct that it be corrected so 
that we will receive that which the jury awarded us, 
award us in the judgment proper attorneys' fees on 
this appeal, and then affirm. 
Res~pectfully submitted, 
Boston Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
SHIRLEY P. JONES 
BENJAMIN L. RICH 
GORDON R. STRONG. 
-.Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents. 
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